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**Foreign Pressure
and
the Japanese Policymaking Process:**

A Theoretical Framework

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Introduction

This paper presents the theoretical chapter of the dissertation that the author is currently writing under the supervision of Professor J.A.A. Stockwin of the University of Oxford. The provisional title of the dissertation is *The Japanese Policymaking Process: The Response to Foreign Pressure over Global Environmental Concerns, 1987 - 92*. The basic question to answer and the objectives to achieve in the dissertation can be summarised as follows.

> In the late 1980s and early 1990s, Japan was subject to severe international criticisms in the area of global environmental issues. By 1992, consequently, Japan had changed its policies on ozone depletion, drift-net fishing, and imports of African elephant ivory, while it had not substantially changed its other related policies on, for example, scientific whaling, and imports of tropical timber. This raises the question of how and under what conditions foreign pressure led to policy change in this area. In order to answer this basic question, the dissertation conducts five case studies on the above global environmental issues during the period from 1987 to 1992.

> The first aim of this multi-case research is to describe Japanese policymaking processes in the events mentioned above, using a revised version of the policy window model designed by John W. Kingdon, with particular focus on foreign actors, industrial policy communities, and environmental policy sponsors. The underlying assumption is that policy change can be explained by the analysis of the policymaking process. Although the cases selected for this research are critical for an understanding of Japanese global environmental policy, this thesis does not attempt to offer a comprehensive study of the topic. The second aim is to use the above-mentioned case studies as a basis for analytical generalisation about the policymaking process by which foreign pressure (*gaiatsu*) does or does not lead to policy change. For this purpose, this thesis compares several propositions suggested by the relevant literature with the findings from each of the five cases. Although Japanese policymaking processes are too diverse and complex for simple generalisation, it seems possible empirically to draw out some characteristics of the process triggered by foreign pressure, and thus to contribute to further understanding of politics in general.

First, this paper reviews the literature concerning the effect of foreign pressure on the Japanese policymaking process. Then, special attention is given to the policy community approach of Martin J. Smith, and the policy window model of John W. Kingdon, which lay the foundation of the theoretical framework for this research. Finally, the questions and propositions of the dissertation are presented along the line of the revised policy window model.

Review of the Literature

There are some article-length studies dealing with Japanese global environmental policy in the late 1980s and early 1990s. Despite some differences in emphasis, Weidner (1989),[1] Holliman (1990),[2] Miller and Moore (1991),[3] and Maull (1992)[4] intuitively share the claim that foreign pressure was the driving force bringing about symbolic or substantive changes in global environmental policy in Japan,[5] where public awareness of environmental issues was low and where environmental

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[1] Helmut Weidner, "Japanese Environmental Policy in an International Perspective: Lessons for a Preventive Approach," in Shigeto Tsuru and Helmut Weidner (eds.), *Environmental Policy in Japan* (Edition Sigma, Berlin, 1989), pp. 479-552.

[2] Jonathan Holliman, "Environmentalism with a Global Scope," *Japan Quarterly* (July-September 1990), pp. 284-90.

[3] Alan S. Millar and Curtis Moore, *Japan and the Global Environment* (Center for Global Change, University of Maryland, College Park, MD, 1991).

[4] Hanns W. Maull, "Japan's Global Environmental Policies," in Andrew Hurrell and Benedict Kingsbury (eds.), *The International Politics of the Environment* (Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1992), pp. 354-72.

[5] Weidner, "Japanese Environmental Policy in an International Perspective," p. 522; Holliman, "Environmentalism with a Global Scope," p. 290; Millar and Moore, *Japan and the Global Environment*, p. 18 and p. 38; and Maull, "Japan's Global Environmental Policies," pp. 366-8 and p. 371.

For Japan's global environmental policy, see also Pat Murdo, "Japan's Environmental Policies: The International Dimension," p. 12, *JEI Report* (Japan Economic Institute, Washington, D.C., 9 March 1990), and OECD, *OECD Environmental Performance Reviews: Japan* (OECD, Paris, 1994).

non-governmental organisations (NGOs) were ineffective.[6] Taking the literature into account, it is perhaps right to assume at the outset that in the late 1980s and early 1990s foreign pressure at least gave impetus to some changes in Japanese policies concerning international economic activities that were detrimental to the global environment.[7] In this connection, Schreurs (1995) [8] makes an important contribution to understanding Japanese policymaking in this policy area by conducting case studies on ozone depletion and global warming. Although she indicates "a general change in stance on the part of business, the LDP, and the economic ministries"[9] and Japan's more proactive stance on global warming, she broadly admits that Japan was a reactive state as regards the global environment.[10] What is more important, she argues

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[6] In general, this claim is made in comparison with other developed countries. Regarding Brazilian policymaking, for example, Hurrell points out the political weakness of the domestic environmental movement and emphasises the role of foreign pressure in the Amazonian deforestation issue. Andrew Hurrell, "Brazil and Amazonian Deforestation," p. 416-8, in Andrew Hurrell and Benedict Kingsbury (eds.), *The International Politics of the Environment* (Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1992), pp. 398-429.

[7] For further details of Japanese global environmental policy, see Chapter 2 of this thesis.

[8] Miranda A. Schreurs, "Policy Laggard or Policy Leader?: Global Environmental Policy-Making Under the Liberal Democratic Party," in *The Journal of Pacific Asia*, 2 (1995), pp. 3-33.

It is a complete fallacy to suppose that foreign pressure always leads to policy change. Stockwin observes that there is a minimal response in Japan only when foreign pressure surpasses domestic pressure to an intolerable extent, since the system is quite sensitive to the latter. As Mikanagi suggests that "*gaiatsu* works only under particular conditions" (p. 53), however, certain domestic political conditions seem no less important than the level of foreign pressure in determining whether policy change will occur or not. J.A.A. Stockwin, "Dynamic and Immobilist Aspects of Japanese Politics," p. 19, in J.A.A Stockwin, et al., *Dynamic and Immobilist Politics in Japan* (University of Hawaii Press, Honolulu, 1988), pp. 1- 21; and Yumiko Mikanagi, *Japan's Trade Policy: Action or reaction?* (Routledge, London; New York, 1996), pp. 38-53.

[9] Schreurs, "Policy Laggard or Policy Leader?" p. 33.

Maddock also sheds light on the emergence of domestic forces in Japan that could make i t a global environmental leader in the near future. Rowland T. Maddock, "Japan and Global Environmental Leadership," *Journal of Northeast Asian Studies* (Winter 1994), pp. 37-48.

[10] Schreurs, "Policy Laggard or Policy Leader?" p. 31. She illustrates this with the case of ozone depletion.

It is generally agreed that foreign pressure plays a crucial role in policymaking in Japan, the "reactive state," as Calder calls it. This observation seems most plausible for the mid-1980s onwards, when the United States started to exert direct pressure on Japan to

that foreign pressure did not give rise to policy change "until linked to the interests of domestic policy actors."[11] This is in line with the observations of previous studies on other policy areas by Allison, Calder and Pempel: foreign pressure on policymaking is effective when there is domestic support for that pressure.[12]

In this connection, the concept of a policy sponsor, which Campbell employs in his study on Japanese old-age policy changes,[13] is worth mentioning. Although this concept is used in a context that has nothing to do with foreign pressure, it can be applied to those who support foreign pressure in the domestic political arena. Campbell proposes that:

> the presence or absence of an effective sponsor - one with sufficient skills, resources, and drive to take charge of the process - is the single most important "variable" in determining whether and when a policy change will occur, and sometimes its content as well.[14]

In addition, he contends that, in the case of Japanese politics, effective sponsors of policy change are generally government ministries or agencies ("bureaucratic sponsorship"), but, at the same time, he also points out the weakness of bureaucratic sponsors: they often face a lack of resources for policy change if the issue in question becomes

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change its policies on, for example, economic liberalisation, foreign aid and international security arrangements. Kent E. Calder, "Japanese Foreign Economic Policy Formation: Explaining the Reactive State," p. 518, *World Politics* (July 1987), pp. 517-41. See also, for example, Kenneth B. Pyle, *The Japanese Question* (The AEI Press, Washington, D.C., 1992), pp. 111-113; Mikanagi, *Japan's Trade Policy*, p. 38; and Yamamoto Yoshinobu, *Kokusaiteki Sôgoizon* (Tokyo University Press, Tokyo, 1989). P. 98.

[11] Schreurs, "Policy Laggard or Policy Leader?" p. 31.

[12] Gary D. Allinson, "Introduction," p. 8, in Gary D. Allinson and Yasunori Sone (eds.), *Political Dynamics in Contemporary Japan* (Cornell University Press, Ithaca; London, 1993), pp. 1-14; Kent E. Calder, *Crisis and Compensation: Public Policy and Political Stability in Japan* (Princeton University Press, Princeton; Oxford, 1988), pp. 478-80; T. J. Pempel, "The Unbundling of "Japan, Inc.": The Changing Dynamics of Japanese Policy Formation," pp. 296-306, *Journal of Japanese Studies* (summer 1987), pp. 271-306.

controversial.[15] The Environment Agency, which is likely to emerge as a policy sponsor, is a good example of a rather weak government department; therefore, if the agency becomes a policy sponsor, it needs to be assisted, for example by foreign pressure, by domestic public support, or by other politically powerful actors such as politicians of the ruling party.[16]

Nevertheless, not only policy sponsors but also those who act against foreign pressure deserve attention. A series of policy changes on global environmental issues from the late 1980s onwards do not mean that the Japanese elite as a whole became the policy sponsors of foreign pressure. For example, Japan did not change its substantive stance on scientific whaling or imports of tropical timber even in the late 1980s and early 1990s, when foreign pressure intensified and when general institutional change was under way to accommodate more environmental concerns.[17] This policy inertia implies that the whaling and tropical timber industries successfully resisted any policy changes that conflicted with their interests. By definition, foreign pressure is exerted with a view to changing domestic policy or institutions; it follows that such pressure is very likely to entail a domestic schism between those who support it and

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[13] John Creighton Campbell, *How Policies Change: the Japanese Government and the Aging Society* (Princeton University Press, Princeton; Oxford, 1992).
[14] Ibid., p. 47.
[15] Ibid., pp. 388-90.
[16] In the case of countermeasures against global warming, Schreurs describes the LDP and the Environment Agency as the policy sponsors. Schreurs, "Policy Laggard or Policy Leader?"
pp. 24-8.
[17] Ibid., p. 33.

those who oppose it.[18] When it comes to foreign pressure which attempts to regulate international economic activities by Japan that harm the environment, it is appropriate to pay more attention to resistance to change on the part of those involved in such activities. In other words, an account of Japanese policymaking on the global environment seems to require analysis of three vectors involved in both policy change and inertia: foreign pressure, and two types of domestic pressure for and against foreign pressure. Policy changes, however, cannot be explained only by the aggregation of these vectors; the reality is much more complicated than such a pluralistic view. In other words, it is also necessary to consider complex linkages between international and domestic politics, and intricate domestic political institutions that have individual autonomy. For this reason, attention is now given to the wider literature on foreign pressure.

The literature on foreign pressure

As mentioned above, Japan has been labelled a reactive state, and consequently there are several works that concentrate on the effect of foreign pressure on the Japanese policymaking process, most notably those of Schoppa (1997),[19] Orr (1990),[20] and Mikanagi (1996)[21]

(1) The two-level game model

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[18] Yamamoto, *Kokusaiteki Sôgoizon*, p. 93.
[19] Leonard J. Schoppa, *Bargaining with Japan: What American Pressure can and cannot do* (Columbia University Press, New York, 1997).
[20] Robert M. Orr, *The Emergence of Japan's Foreign Aid Power* (Columbia University Press, New York, 1990).
[21] Mikanagi, *Japan's Trade Policy*.

Schoppa seems to be the first scholar to give much theoretical attention to the effectiveness of foreign pressure in relation to Japanese domestic politics, and to address the very question that this thesis asks: how and when does foreign pressure influence the policy process and policy outcomes?[22] In a case study of the US-Japanese negotiations called the Structural Impediments Initiative (SII) and the Clinton Framework Talks, he outlines six synergistic strategies adopted by negotiators, such as "threats," "participation expansion," and "alternative specification," and hypothesises the domestic political conditions under which these strategies are most likely to be successful. In his conclusion, he confirms some of the hypotheses, as follows:

- Threats will be more effective "if they promise to impose high enough costs on the right domestic actors in the target country, are seen as ratifiable and otherwise credible, and are perceived as legitimate."[23]

- Participation expansion will work well "when pressure is able to bring into the policy process previously excluded domestic actors who support U.S. demands for their own reasons."[24]

- Alternative specification will be more likely to succeed "when Japan has a big and recognized policy problem in search of proposals that can be packaged as a 'solution.'"[25]

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[22] Schoppa, *Bargaining with Japan*. For an earlier version of this book, see Leonard J. Schoppa, "Two-level games and bargaining outcomes: why *gaiatsu* succeeds in Japan in some cases but not others," *International Organisation*, 47 (Summer 1993), pp. 353-86.
[23] Schoppa, *Bargaining with Japan*, p. 307.
[24] Ibid., p. 309.
[25] Ibid., p. 310.

Based on the two-level game model proposed by Putnam,[26] Schoppa's study takes some important steps towards focusing on the interaction of two levels of politics: international and domestic.

This is particularly important for the analysis of foreign economic policy because the increasing trend towards economic interdependence among nations has blurred the boundary between foreign and domestic policies and, consequently, brought more domestic governmental and non-governmental actors into the making of foreign policy.[27] For instance, it is becoming difficult to make and implement foreign economic policy without involving ministries and agencies other than the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) and the Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI).[28] This tendency seems to be found in the area of global environmental politics as well,[29] in an era when "the world has now moved beyond economic interdependence to ecological interdependence - and even beyond that to an intermeshing of the two."[30] In such circumstances, few scholars are satisfied with the simple 'rational actor' assumption, which treats the state as a monolithic actor, and the

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[26] Robert Putnam, "Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level Games," *International Organization*, 42 (Summer 1988), pp. 427-60.

[27] Arase illustrates some differences between foreign economic policy and foreign policy. David Arase, *Buying Power: the political economy of Japan's foreign aid* (Lynne Rienner Publishers, Boulder, Colorado, 1995), pp. 3-4.

[28] Mikanagi, *Japan's Trade Policy*, p. 94. For the internationalisation of Japanese ministries and agencies, see Kusano Atsushi, "Taigai Seisaku Kettei no Kikô to Katei," in Aruga Tadashi et al. (eds.), *Nihon no Gaikô* (Tokyo University Press, Tokyo, 1989), pp. 53-92.

[29] It should be noted here that many of the activities and policies related to the global environment fall under the jurisdictions, not of the Environment Agency or the Ministry of Foreign Affairs but, of various economic ministries. Miller and Moore, "Japan and the Global Environment," pp. 10-12.

[30] Jim MacNeill, Pieter Winsemius, and Taizo Yakushiji, *Beyond Interdependence* (Oxford University Press, New York; Oxford, 1991), p. 4.

policymaking process as a black box; i.e. foreign policy is a nation's rational reaction to external stimuli. There is general agreement that it is beneficial, from an analytical point of view, to grasp the roles of the relevant actors, and the political relations between them, in the policymaking process.

From this perspective, it should be noted that Schoppa still focuses mainly on international negotiations and the effectiveness of the strategies employed by negotiators, and consequently defines foreign pressure as "an umbrella term for a variety of such strategies."[31] In this dissertation, foreign pressure is seen in a wider context; foreign pressure can also be exerted unstrategically, for instance by public opinion abroad. With its broader definition of foreign pressure, this thesis seeks to analyse the role of domestic actors, and their relationships in more depth. In order to gain a complete picture of the policymaking process, it is necessary to investigate the "intragovernmental game" as well as the two-level game. For this type of investigation, Orr combines two useful concepts: bureaucratic politics and transgovernmental relations.

(2) The combination of bureaucratic politics and transgovernmental relations

Orr (1990) throws light on the "bureaucratic coalition building" between the United States and Japan, where the former exerts influence on the latter's foreign aid programme, by employing two analytical tools: the

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[31] Schoppa, *Bargaining with Japan*, p. 5.

concepts of "bureaucratic politics"[32] and "transgovernmental relations." Both concepts are based on the assumption that the government is not a single unit, which seems to be in line with the general agreement that the age of "Japan, Inc." is over, if it ever existed.[33] The concept of bureaucratic politics employed here is not restricted to "bureaucratic politics" in Graham T. Allison's narrow sense: that is politics "as a *resultant* of various bargaining games among [individual top] players in the national government;"[34] in the context of Japanese policymaking, the concept also embraces organisational bargaining among government ministries, mainly at levels of bureaus and divisions. In addition, Orr introduces the concept of transgovernmental relations with a view to explaining the role of external pressure from the United States.[35] In the case of Japanese aid to Vietnam in the late 1970s, for example, he shows that the National Security Council and the State Department of the United States made a coalition with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) to put pressure on the Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI) and some members of the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) to stop providing technical aid.[36]

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[32] In an earlier work on Japanese aid policy, Rix also emphasises the importance of this concept. Alan Rix, *Japan's Economic Aid* (Croom Helm, London, 1980), p. 16.

[33] Pempel, "The Unbundling of "Japan, Inc.,"" p. 304.

[34] Graham T. Allison, *Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis* (Little, Brown and Company, Boston, 1971), p. 6. See also Rix, *Japan's Economic Aid*, p. 16.

[35] Orr, *The Emergence of Japan's Foreign Aid Power*, p. 4. He mentions that this approach was originally discussed by Keohane and Nye. See Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye, "Transgovernmental Relations and International Organisations," *World Politics,* 27 (October 1974).

[36] Orr, *The Emergence of Japan's Foreign Aid Power*, pp. 121-2.

These two concepts seem to provide a good starting point for the exploration of the Japanese policymaking process with regard to global environmental problems. Three points, however, need to be made. First, as the above example shows, bureaucratic politics is not always a bargaining process; sometimes it is a one-way pressuring process. When there is no agreement about the allocation of authority among ministries, or when authority is divided between several ministries, ministries exercise what Ôtake calls the "bargaining type of influence" on each other. When there is prior agreement where authority resides, on the other hand, interested ministries exercise the "pressuring type of influence" on the ministry with the authority.[37] In the latter case, the exercise of influence is unilateral rather than multi- or bi-lateral. The Japanese policymaking processes selected for this research seem close, not to the "bargaining model," but to the "pressuring model," since in many cases authority resides with an economic ministry that will protect an industry under foreign pressure.[38]

Second, although foreign pressure is likely to produce bureaucratic politics[39] (and this seems to be true of Japanese policymaking on the global environment[40]), it is a mistake to assume that whenever foreign pressure is exerted on Japan, a bureaucratic sponsor will emerge, and the interministerial game will take place. For instance, it seems reasonable to

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[37] Ôtake Hideo, *Gendai Nihon no Seiji Kenryoku Keizai Kenryoku*, 2nd edn (Sanítsushobô, Tokyo, 1996), pp. 248-53.
[38] Ôtake distinguishes these two kinds of influence, and calls them the "bargaining model" and the "pressure model." Ibid.
[39] Yamamoto, *Kokusaiteki Sôgoizon*, p. 92.

suppose that Japan sometimes acts as a monolithic state, standing firm against foreign demands deemed unjustifiable from any Japanese point of view. Moreover, one should not dismiss the possibility that the Diet may become the centre of politics, with politicians divided into those for and those against foreign pressure,[41] even though the likelihood of seeing this "camp conflict" type of policymaking is considered small in the case of global environmental issues.[42]

Finally, neither of these concepts embraces non-governmental, economic and environmental actors. Nishikawa does not hesitate to say that "It is regrettable that Orr did not analyze the private sector."[43] This omission is even more questionable in the analysis of global environmental politics. In the literature on international relations, many scholars point out that environmental groups play an important role in this political arena.[44] Therefore, it is necessary to employ the concept of "transnational relations," including "transgovernmental relations," for the analysis of global environmental politics.[45] In other words, one needs to consider

[40] See, for example, Maull, "Japan's Global Environmental Policies," p. 357.

[41] Yamamoto, *Kokusaiteki Sôgoizon*, p. 95.

[42] For camp conflict, see, for example, T.J. Pempel, *Patterns of Japanese Policymaking: Experiences from Higher Education* (Westview Press, Boulder Colorado, 1978).

[43] Jun Nishikawa, "Deciphering Japan Inc.," p. 215, *Japan Quarterly* (April-June 1991), pp. 214-7.

[44] See Gareth Porter and Janet Welsh Brown, *Global Environmental Politics: Dilemmas in World Politics*, 2nd edn (Westview Press, Boulder; San Francisco; Oxford, 1996), p. 16; Andrew Hurrell and Benedict Kingsbury, "The International Politics of the Environment: An Introduction," p.20, in Hurrell and Kingsbury (eds.), *The International Politics of the Environment* (Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1992), pp. 1-50; and Oran R. Young, "Global Environmental Change and International Governance," p. 14, in Ian H. Rowlands and Greene Malony, *Global Environmental Change and International Relations* (Macmillan, Basingstoke, 1991), pp. 6-18.

[45] Keohane and Nye state that "T*ransgovernmental* applies when we relax the realist assumption that states act coherently as units; *transnational* applies when we relax the assumption that states are the only units." Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye, *Power*

cross-national links and influences, not only between government ministries but also between non-governmental groups.[46]

Similarly, the concept of bureaucratic politics needs to incorporate non-governmental actors and political actors as well, since "bureaucratic power is . . . relational in the sense that it emerges from the structure of LDP-bureaucrats-interest group alignments and the political exchanges that take place among them," as Okimoto puts it.[47] In issues that are non-politicised, as is often the case with global environmental issues, bureaucratic politics can be defined as the process of conflict and coordination taking place between government ministries backed by the interest groups under their respective jurisdiction. Suppose that there is foreign pressure against activities by a business group that adversely affect the global environment, and that this group puts domestic pressure on a relevant government ministry not to regulate it;[48] that ministry will attempt to support the business group against other ministries who back the foreign pressure, as long as it serves that ministry's interests. Moreover, *zoku* politicians (policy tribes)[49] can play

and Interdependence: World Politics in Transition (Little, Brown and Company, Boston; Toronto, 1977), p. 25.

[46] Maull, "Japan's Global Environmental Policies," pp. 366-7.
The formation of such transnational relations is observed in a case study by Hurrell on Amazonian deforestation, and in a case study by Kusano on the Japan - U.S. orange negotiations. Hurrell, "Brazil and Amazonian Deforestation," pp. 414-6; Kusano Atsushi, *Nichibei Orenji Kôshô* (Nihon Keizai Shinbunsha, Tokyo, 1983).

[47] Daniel I. Okimoto, *Between MITI and the Market: Japanese Industrial Policy for High Technology* (Stanford University Press, Stanford, 1989), p. 226.

[48] According to Muramatsu Michio's survey in 1980, agricultural and economic groups tend to target the bureaucracy rather than political parties when they attempt to affect the policymaking process. Tsujinaka Yutaka, *Riekishudan* (Tokyo University Press, Tokyo, 1988), p. 119.

[49] Satô Seizaburô defines *zoku* politicians as "groups of leading MPs, organized around the interests of specific administrative agencies, who exert influence on a daily basis on

an intermediary role between a ministry and interest groups, while the ruling party can coordinate the competing interests of different ministries, as indicated by Schreurs' case study on global warming. In short, bureaucratic politics should not be confined to bureaucratic actors alone. In contrast to Orr's analysis, Mikanagi's considers the relationship between a ministry and the private sector.

(3) The ministry-centred approach

Mikanagi (1996) analyses the domestic conditions under which foreign pressure can have a significant impact on trade liberalisation in Japan, by conducting case studies of the US-Japan trade negotiations, known as the Market-Oriented Sector-Selective (MOSS) talks, in 1985 and 1986.[50] This focus on domestic factors is based on her finding that "the amount of pressure applied to the Japanese government and the degree of achievement do not correlate."[51] In this analysis, she rejects the debate about élitism, pluralism and corporatism, which attempts to characterise the whole Japanese political system, and employs a "ministry-centred approach" based on the proposition that each ministry is different in terms of its objectives, its level of autonomy and the scope of its policy instruments, all of which affect its capacity to respond to foreign pressure. She argues, for instance, that if there is interministerial conflict

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behalf of those interests." Satô Seizaburô and Matsuzaki Tetsuhisa, "Jimintô Seiken," *Chûô Kôron* (1986), p. 92. (Quoted in Hitoshi Abe, Muneyuki Shindô and Sadafumi Kawato, *The Government and Politics of Japan* (University of Tokyo Press, Tokyo, 1994), pp. 51-2.)

[50] Mikanagi, *Japan's Trade Policy*.

[51] Ibid., p. 52. She maintains that "the international systems-level explanation offers answers to the question *why* Japan responds to *gaiatsu.* However the theoretical framework offered in this book tries to explain *how* Japan responds." Ibid., p. 37.

a ministry is less able to respond, since its autonomy is reduced by other ministries' intervention.[52] In addition, she regards the types of relationship between a ministry and the private sector as an important factor in Japan's responsiveness to foreign pressure. This approach avoids the over-simplification of a macro approach to the Japanese policymaking process, and overcomes the defects in the works of Schoppa and Orr by paying more attention to domestic factors, including the private sector.

Nevertheless, this approach also has the following three limitations. First, Mikanagi puts a ministry's possible relationships with the private sector into four categories: post-promotive, promotive, restructuring and regulatory, and argues that the latter category a ministry finds itself in, the more capacity it possesses to make and implement economic policies.[53] This typology is, however, too simplistic to analyse the details of their relationship or to specify the mechanisms through which a specific relationship operates, as Mikanagi herself admits that "the proximity of relationship between ministries and the private sector varies from sector to sector and ministry to ministry."[54] Second and more important, Mikanagi's work considers the power relationships between a ministry and the private sector only as a zero-sum game. This seems to be based on her implicit assumption that there is always conflict of

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[52] Ibid., p. 28.
[53] For more detailed account of this typology and its impact on the capacity of a ministry, see ibid.,
pp. 31-7.
[54] Ibid., p. 93.

interest between a ministry and the private sector: i.e., that the former favours trade liberalisation and the latter protectionism. In this zero-sum context, for example, she maintains that the electronics sector has more power than MITI because the industry, which is at a post-promotive stage, depends relatively little on the ministry.[55] Finally, political intervention is outside Mikanagi's framework, which mainly deals with issues that are not highly politicised. This is why she treats the highly-politicised issue of forest products as an exceptional case. Although she employs a ministry-centred approach, there seems to be no need to ignore political intervention because, like interministerial intervention, it can be considered a factor limiting the autonomy of the ministry in question.

The policy community approach

It may be possible to improve Mikanagi's approach further by introducing the policy community approach taken by Smith (1993)[56] in the literature on British and United States politics. First, this approach goes beyond Mikanagi's typology, and helps in examining each relationship between a ministry and the private sector more closely within the structural and historical context of the policymaking process.[57] Second, it allows for the possibility of a positive-sum game, as Smith points out that "By working together, a group and a state agency can

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[55] Ibid., p. 74.
[56] Martin J. Smith, *Pressure, Power and Policy: State Autonomy and Policy Networks in Britain and the United States* (Harvester Wheatsheaf, Hemel Hempstead, 1993).
[57] Mikanagi says that "a broader conception of institutional structure, which describes the structural relationship between state and society, will be useful in analysing how societal

increase each other's autonomy in relation to other parts of the state."[58]

This seems particularly true where both actors cooperate to resist external

pressure. Finally, it is a flexible approach, which can deal with political

intervention as well.[59]

Before looking more closely at Smith's approach, it is worth mentioning

the concept of policy networks developed by Marsh and Rhodes (1992),

on which this approach is based. Marsh and Rhodes offer a model of

policy networks: continuous but changeable structural relationships

between a government ministry and interest groups at the sectoral or

sub-sectoral level.[60] In this sense, Marsh and Rhodes regard the policy

interests are represented in the policymaking of a state." Mikanagi, *Japan's Trade Policy*, p. 25.

[58] Smith, *Pressure, Power and Policy*, p. 54.
Regarding the relationship between MITI and an industry, for example, Okimoto holds that "Their relationship is not adversarial or a tug-of-war. They try to pull together in the direction of achieving common goals." Okimoto, *Between MITI and the Market*, p. 144.
[59] Smith, *Pressure, Power and Policy*, p. 7.
[60] David Marsh and R.A.W. Rhodes (eds.), *Policy Networks in British Government* (Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1992).
In Britain, as Marsh (1995) points out, "there has been a significant growth in research using the policy networks concept in the last few years." As Rhodes and Marsh put it, however, "The literature on policy networks has varied disciplinary origins, proliferating terminology, mutually exclusive definitions and, especially, varying levels of analysis." David Marsh, *State Theory and the Policy Network Model* (Department of Government, University of Strathclyde, Glasgow, Scotland, 1995),
p. 1; R.A.W. Rhodes and David Marsh, "Policy Networks in British Politics," p. 18, in Marsh and Rhodes (eds.), *Policy Networks in British Government*, pp. 1-26.
For the policy network concept, see, for example, Marsh and Rhodes (eds.), *Policy Networks in British Government*; Bernd Marin and Renate Mayntz (eds.), *Policy Networks: Empirical Evidence and Theoretical Considerations* (Westview Press, Boulder, Colorado, 1991) (in particular, Chapter 2: Patrick Kenis and Volder Schneider, "Policy Networks and Policy Analysis: Scrutinizing a New Analytical Toolbox," pp. 25-59); *European Journal of Political Research: Special issue: Policy Networks*, 21, 1-2 (February 1992); Koike Osamu, "Seisaku Nettowaaku to Seifukan Kankei," *Chuô Daigaku Shakai Kagaku Kenkyujo Kenkyu Hôkoku*, 16 (February 1995), pp. 27-46; and Shinkawa Toshimitsu, "Seisaku Nettowaaku Ron no Shatei," *Kikan Gyôsei Kanri Kenkyu*, 59 (September 1992), pp. 12-9.
With regard to Japanese politics, Okimoto (1989) and Wilks and Wright (1991) apply a more personal concept of policy networks to Japanese industrial policy in different ways. Okimoto, *Between MITI and the Market*. Stephen Wilks and Maurice Wright (eds.), *The Promotion and Regulation of Industry in Japan* (Macmillan, Basingstoke, 1991). For a study of Japanese science and technology policy networks, see Jonathan Lewis, "Collision of

network as a meso-level concept, which has a role to play between macro-level analysis, which focuses on the broader relationship between the state and civil society, and micro-level analysis, which deals with individual or group behaviour.[61] In this model, policy networks are also seen as "political structures which constrain and facilitate actors within the network" and which thereby affect, but do not determine, policy outcomes.[62] This concept seems to have great explanatory power with respect to global environmental politics, since it can cover a wide range of sectors and sub-sectors, each of which involves a different set of actors in the policymaking process,[63] and since it can be extended to transnational networks.[64] Moreover, Marsh and Rhodes provide a useful typology of policy networks in which tightly integrated "policy

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Interests: The role of the Ruling Party in Science and Technology Policy," *Japan Forum*, 6, 1 (April 1994), pp. 62-72.

There are also some comparative studies using the concept for the analysis of countries including Japan. See, for instance, Stephen Wilks and Maurice Wright (eds.), *Comparative Government Industry Relations: Western Europe, the United States, and Japan* (Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1987); Maurice Wright, "Policy Community, Policy Network and Comparative Industrial Policies," *Political Studies*, 36 (1988), pp. 593-612; and David Knoke et al., *Comparing Policy Networks: Labor politics in the U.S., Germany, and Japan* (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, England, 1996).

[61] Rhodes and Marsh, "Policy Networks in British Politics," p. 1. This is based partly on the belief that "To pursue micro-level analysis in order to explore personal networks will provide a wealth of detail but make it increasingly difficult to generalize about policy networks." Ibid., p. 22. Marsh also argues that the policy network analysis needs to be combined with both macro-level and micro-level analyses, in order to explain the membership and the policy outcomes of policy networks. Marsh, *State Theory and the Policy Network Model*, p. 2. See also Marsh and Rhodes, "Policy Communities and Issue Networks," pp. 266-8, in Marsh and Rhodes (eds.), *Policy Networks in British Government*, pp. 249-68.

[62] Marsh, *State Theory and the Policy Network Model*, p. 2. and p. 4. In this sense, Rhodes calls policy networks "an institutional approach." R.A.W Rhodes, "The Institutional Approach," p. 53, in David Marsh and Gerry Stoker, *Theory and Methods in Political Science* (Macmillan, Basingstoke, 1995), pp. 42-57.

[63] See Robert Garner, *Environmental Politics* (Prentice Hall/Harvester Wheatsheaf, Hemel Hempstead, 1996), p. 155.

[64] Koike, "Seisaku Nettowaaku to Seifukan Kankei," p. 46.

communities" and open "issue networks" are regarded as the end-points on a continuum.[65] Garner summarises this typology as follows:

> At one end is the so-called policy community characterised by regular interaction between a small number of long-standing participants, usually a government agency and certain privileged interest groups, operating within a considerable degree of consensus and closed off both from competing groups not accepting the shared values and from other policy networks. At the other is the so-called issue network, characterized by a considerable degree of openness and flux, with a variety of competing groups able to gain access (Heclo, 1978). These are ideal types and most policy networks will lie between the two extremes. Different networks may, of course, be placed at different positions on the spectrum.[66]

Like Mikanagi, Smith takes an approach that focuses on the autonomy of a government ministry and its relationships with economic and social groups.[67] On the basis of Marsh and Rhodes' notion of policy networks, Smith throws light on the resistance of a policy community to external pressure, and this seems to be helpful in understanding the effect of foreign pressure on the policymaking process.[68] In this regard, it should be noted that Smith's notion of the policy community is broader than that of Marsh and Rhodes in the strict sense, and it includes actual policy networks close to the ideal type of the policy community. Smith argues that a government ministry is motivated to form a policy community as

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[65] This typology is based on the following dimensions: membership (number of participants and type of interests), integration (frequency of interaction, continuity and consensus), resources (distribution of resources within a network and within participating organisations) and power.
For details of this typology, see Table 11. 1, Marsh and Rhodes, "Policy Communities and Issue Networks," p. 251.
[66] Garner, *Environmental Politics*, p. 155.
[67] Smith, *Pressure, Power and Policy*. Regarding the notion of state autonomy, Smith states that "the state/state actors have interests of their own and, in certain circumstances, the ability to transform these interests into policy." Ibid., p. 49.
[68] He defines the role of a policy community as "to prevent change by excluding threats to the dominant interests." Smith, *Pressure, Power and Policy*, p. 76. See also Ôtake, *Gendai Nihon no Seiji Kenryoku Keizai Kenryoku*, p. 51.
Unlike Marsh and Rhodes, Smith admits that a policy network can exist not only at the sectoral or the sub-sectoral level but also around a specific issue. Smith, *Pressure, Power*

a means of extending its autonomy: that is, a means not only of enhancing its ability to implement policy in a relevant policy area, but also of protecting its own interests from external threats, including political and interministerial interventions, by isolating the policy process. Non-governmental participants also find it beneficial to form and maintain a policy community because it can not only institutionalise their access to the policymaking process,[69] but also create a mechanism to resist external threats that could damage their interests as well.[70] Furthermore, he argues that the degree to which a policy network can withstand external pressure largely depends on the character of the network.[71] In other words, the closer a policy network is to the ideal type of policy community, the more resistant it becomes to external pressure.[72]

Smith also considers the dynamic aspect of the policy community.[73] When new ideas, issues, or groups manage to enter a policy community, the nature of the community (e.g. its strong consensus and exclusiveness) gradually changes. Consequently, it moves towards the issue network end of Marsh and Rhodes' continuum; and the

and Policy, p. 65. Despite this difference, Marsh recognises that Smith is "seen as associated with" Marsh and Rhodes. Marsh, *State Theory and the Policy Network Model*, p. 1.

[69] In his model, policy communities are seen as structures that privilege certain interests in the policymaking process. Smith, *Pressure, Power and Policy*, p. 72.
For an institutional account of Japanese interest group behaviour, see Aurelia George, "Japanese Interest Group Behaviour: An Institutional Approach," in J.A.A. Stockwin et al., *Dynamic and Immobilist Politics in Japan* (Macmillan, Basingstoke, 1988), pp. 106-40.

[70] See Smith, *Pressure, Power and Policy*, p. 59.

[71] Ibid., p. 98.

[72] In this connection, Marsh and Rhodes offer two related comments: policy communities or "those networks with a dominant economic or professional interest are the most resistant

community thus becomes more subject to external pressure. In this context, Smith explains the implications of the entry of other government ministries into an existing policy community as follows:

> If a community contains more than one actor with political authority then the ability of the community to withstand external threats is likely to be less. In this situation conflict can develop between the decision-making institutions and this leads to conflict over territory, the politicisation of the issue area and the inclusion of an increasing number of groups. Consequently the community is destroyed.[74]

Thus, if a government ministry supporting external pressure - that is, a bureaucratic policy sponsor - intervenes in a policy community, it is more likely that that pressure will bring about policy change that is against the interests of the community. Smith also points out that "If controversy develops, well-resourced political actors like Presidents or Prime Ministers can become involved in the policy arena and thus remove decision-making from the community."[75] In sum, Smith's policy community approach seems to provide useful insights into the way foreign pressure leads to policy change or inertia.

In addition, this approach is particularly suitable for the analysis of Japanese politics because there are considered to be strong structural relationships between a government ministry and industries under its jurisdiction.[76] In such structures, trade associations play a critical role as

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to change," and "Policy communities, in particular, are associated with policy continuity." Marsh and Rhodes, "Policy Communities and Issue Networks," pp. 261-2.

[73] Smith, *Pressure, Power and Policy*, pp. 91-8.

[74] Ibid., p. 98.

[75] Ibid., p. 95.

[76] John Creighton Campbell, "Bureaucratic Primacy: Japanese Policy Communities in an American Perspective," p. 18 *Governance: An International Journal of Policy and Administration*, 2, 1 (January 1989), pp. 5-22.
Muramatsu and Krauss observe that there are "relatively institutionalised relationships" between elements of the bureaucracy, the LDP and interest groups in Japan, and call them "issue or interest subgovernments." Michio Muramatsu and Ellis S. Krauss,

interest groups, representing their respective industries in relation to the ministry in charge.[77] Although a trade association is supervised by the ministry, their relationship is founded on mutual dependence.[78] The ministry depends on a trade association in order to obtain information on the industry, to gather industry opinion, to get the industry's explicit or implicit consent to policy drafts, and to secure cooperation with the industry in the implementation of a policy. On the other hand, a trade association depends on its supervising ministry in order to obtain advance information on policy changes, to exercise influence in the policymaking process, to request favourable consideration when it comes to the implementation of relevant laws, and to secure authorisation for their voluntary control.[79]

"The Conservative Policy Line and the Development of Patterned Pluralism," p. 538, in Kôzô Yamamura and Yasukichi Yasuba, *The Political Economy of Japan Volume1: The Domestic Transformation* (Stanford University Press, Stanford, California, 1987), pp. 516-54. With regard to Japanese politics, the concept of subgovernments was first employed by Campbell to analyse Japanese budget politics. John Creighton Campbell, *Contemporary Japanese Budget Politics* (University of California Press, Berkeley; London, 1977). Although this concept is similar to that of the policy community, one of the major differences is that the subgovernment presupposes the inclusion of a relevant division of the LDP's Policy Affairs Research Council. In this regard, however, Ôtake points out that although a subgovernment is usually the exclusive policymaking institution in a particular policy area, the involvement of the LDP is supplementary so long as there are no budgetary or legislative implications. Ôtake, *Gendai Nihon no Seiji Kenryoku Keizai Kenryoku*, pp. 191-2. Similarly, Tani labels the policymaking alliance an Iron Triangle, and expects that it may gradually be broken down by an emerging environmental issue network. Tani Katsuhiro, "The Legislative Process of the Fundamental Law on the Environment; From Iron Triangle to Issue Network," p. 159, *Research Reports of the Anan College of Technology* 30 (March 1994), pp. 145-161.

[77] Hiwatari attributes the success of Japanese industrial policy to the "organised markets," which are characterised by functional division, oligopolistic competition, and interlocking business groupings (*Keiretsu*). Such markets also seem to enable trade associations to act effectively. Hiwatari Nobuhiro, *Sengo Nihon no Shijô to Seiji* (Tokyo University Press, Tokyo, 1991), p. 11.

[78] Samuels calls the political interdependence of the state and the private sector the politics of "reciprocal consent," with which he analyses Japanese energy markets. Richard J. Samuels, *The Business of the Japanese State* (Cornell University Press, Ithaca; London, 1987).

[79] Nishio Masaru, "Shôchô no Shoshô Jimu to Chôsa Kenkyu Kikaku," pp. 67-8, in Nishio Masaru and Muramatsu Michio (eds), *Kôza Gyôseigaku*, 4 (Yuhikaku, Tokyo, 1995), pp. 39-76.

This mutual dependence is further strengthened by "functional cooperative relationships" between a ministry and each industry under its jurisdiction, as Ôtake puts it.[80] These relationships are based on the fact that they share fundamentally the same perspective; the ministry tries to see political issues and social situations through the eyes of an industry, and the ministry's interest in enhancing its authority in the government is closely linked with an industry's interest in developing itself. For a ministry, maintaining this type of relationship is rational from Junko Kato's point of view that a ministry simultaneously tries to pursue "two objectives: increasing their (organizational) power and reflecting "social welfare" considerations in policymaking where social welfare is determined by the officials' technocratic ideas and specialised knowledge."[81] Such ideas and knowledge seem to be shared by a policy community; consequently, "social welfare" tends to be defined from the community's perspective.

The policy window model

The importance of focusing on the policy community cannot be over-emphasised, as discussed above, but policy change should be analysed in a broader framework as well. In this sense, John Kingdon's policy window model[82] is useful since it can explain the dynamics of a policy

[80] Ôtake, *Gendai Nihon no Seiji Kenryoku Keizai Kenryoku*, p. 254.
[81] Junko Kato, *The Problem of Bureaucratic Rationality: Tax Politics in Japan* (Princeton University Press, Princeton, New Jersey, 1994), p. 36.
[82] John W. Kingdon, *Agendas, Alternatives, and Public Policies*, 2nd edn (HarperCollins College Publishers, New York, 1995).

community, and other relevant factors leading to policy change. Kingdon, after pointing out the limitations of incrementalism and the rational policymaking approach, introduces a revised version of the Cohen-March-Olsen garbage can model.[83] In this revised model, the separate streams of problem recognition, generation of policy proposals, and political events come together at certain critical times, most probably during the opening of policy windows - "opportunities for pushing pet proposals or conceptions of problems,"[84] and in the presence of the right policy entrepreneurs.[85] The coupling of these three streams pushes a given subject onto a "decision agenda"[86] that are up for a final, authoritative decision, and increases the chance of a policy change. This model emphasises not only the randomness of policymaking, but also the structural elements of the process streams, of couplings, and of the outer system;[87] it attempts to explain agenda setting in the problem and the politics streams, and alternative specification in the policy stream. By quoting Kingdon, Schoppa pays attention not only to the politics stream but also to "the possibility that international pressure can affect policy outcomes by influencing these other streams,"[88] and incorporates this argument in his revised two-level game model. In this dissertation, the

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[83] For this model, see Michael Cohen, James March, and Johan Olsen, "A Garbage Can Model of Organizational Choice," *Administrative Science Quarterly*, 17 (March 1972), pp. 1-25.

[84] Kingdon, *Agendas, Alternatives, and Public Policies*, p. 20.

[85] Another important concept in this model is that of policy entrepreneurs: that is, "people who are willing to invest their resources in pushing their pet proposals or problems." Ibid. This concept is equivalent to the policy sponsor used by Campbell.

[86] Kingdon distinguishes two types of agendas: the *governmental agenda*, "the list of subjects that are getting attention," and the *decision agenda*, "the list of subjects within the governmental agenda that are up for an active decision." Ibid., p. 4.

[87] See Ibid., pp. 206-8.

[88] Schoppa, *Bargaining with Japan*, p. 31.

reverse is attempted: Schoppa's model is partially incorporated into the policy window model, which takes foreign pressure into account.

The policy window model, which focuses on the process prior to a final, authoritative choice made by presidential decision or by a legislative vote, can offer an excellent analytical tool for studying Japanese policymaking on the global environment, where the Prime Minister and the Diet seem to have limited roles. For some issues, however, it is necessary to submit a bill to the Diet in order to enact a new law, to amend an existing law, or to formulate a budget, with a view to accommodating foreign pressure. In this case, opposition parties are also involved in the process in the Diet, most substantially in the relevant standing and special committees that give detailed deliberation to bills.[89] In this process, policy change is confirmed and given concrete form unless opposition parties raise an objection to it, since the ruling party has already deliberated on the change with the bureaucracy and the Cabinet before enactment. Although policy can also be amended in the process, incorporating demands from opposition parties, it is assumed at this stage that the legislative process can affect policy outcomes only to a small extent, if at all. In many cases, similarly, a Cabinet decision is presumed to be a formality, simply endorsing a bureaucratic choice. Therefore, it is crucial to pay careful attention to the pre-decision process that the policy window model attempts to analyse.

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[89] Abe, Shindo and Kawato, *The Government and Politics of Japan*, p. 21.

Statement of the Questions and Propositions

This thesis seeks to analyse the Japanese policymaking[90] process in the area of global environmental issues; in particular, it addresses the following question:

> How and under what domestic conditions did foreign pressure lead
>
> to policy change in the global environmental area in Japan?

In this dissertation, foreign pressure is defined not just as foreign pressure in a limited sense, that is the application, by one or more foreign actors, of strong persuasion with the intention of affecting domestic policymaking,[91] but also includes more indirect and latent foreign pressure such as that of public opinion and anticipated reactions abroad that also affect domestic actors. This definition of foreign pressure should be distinguished from that of foreign influence: the unintentional and often unperceived effect of foreign events and ideas on domestic politics. From an analytical point of view, this distinction is useful since foreign pressure and influence affect the policy process and policy outcomes in different ways. As for policy change, this concept means change, in favour of the global environment, in industrial policy that is alleged to have been damaging the global eco-system.

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[90] Some scholars use "decision making" to mean the same as "policy making" while others distinguish the two. Robinson illustrates the distinction as follows: "one may refer to decision making by the presidency or by Congress, but together these institutions constitute part of the total policy-making process of the United States." James A. Robinson, "Decision Making: Political Aspects,"
p. 55, *International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences,* 4 (The Macmillan Company and The Free Press, New York, 1968), pp. 55-62. This thesis treats these terms in the same way as Robinson.

[91] Renwick and Swinburn define pressure as "the application, by groups, of organized persuasion with the intention of affecting decision-making." Alan Renwick and Ian Swinburn, *Basic Political Concepts,* 2nd edn (Stanley Thornes, Cheltenham, 1987), p. 160. It is not the intention of this thesis to discuss a normative question such as whether a policy outcome is morally satisfactory or not.

The rest of this chapter revises Kingdon's policy window model so that it can reflect the effect of foreign pressure on the policymaking process, and asks the following basic questions: *Who were the major participants in the process? How and when did foreign pressure affect the problem, the policy, and the politics streams? How did the opening of a policy window help in coupling the three streams?* Along with this descriptive framework, some propositions about the policymaking process initiated by foreign pressure are tentatively presented, drawing on the review of the literature above, which in turn constitutes a theoretical framework for this dissertation. This section is divided into three parts: the major participants, the three streams, and stream coupling with the opening of a policy window.

Major participants

(1) Foreign actors

Foreign actors such as governments, international organisations and environmental NGOs exert pressure on their counterparts or on different types of actors in Japan with a view to changing the Japanese practices or policies considered to have adversely affected the global environment.[92] Occasionally they forge a cross-national coalition with their Japanese counterparts or establish a branch in Japan. For example, Greenpeace and the Worldwide Fund for Nature (WWF), international environmental NGOs, both have a cross-national link with their

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[92] Maull maintains that political pressure also comes partly from "Japan's transnational corporations, which have had to confront environmentalist pressures abroad and which have begun to suffer from Japan's bad image as an environmental predator." Maull, "Japan's Global Environmental Policies," p. 366.

associate organisations in Japan. Sometimes it is through such transnational relations that foreign pressure is conveyed into the political process. As well as the route taken, the kinds of strategies that foreign actors employ must affect the policy process, and thus the policy outcomes, as Schoppa argues. On the basis of the two-level game model, he proposes that policy change is more likely to occur when foreign actors employ strategies that resonate with domestic politics. Among the strategies he illustrates, synergistic threats deserve special attention in the context of Japanese global environmental policies that drew harsh criticism from abroad. To borrow Schoppa's words, *foreign threats are more effective "if they promise to impose high enough costs on the right domestic actors in the target country, are seen as ratifiable and otherwise credible, and are perceived as legitimate."* [93]

The other strategies of alternative specification and participation expansion are mentioned below in the sections on the policy stream and the politics stream respectively.

(2) Industrial policy community

An economic ministry[94] cooperates with those of its industries whose interests are expected to be jeopardised by foreign pressure, in order that there will be no policy change disadvantageous to them. This cooperation can be seen as the protection of their interests by an

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[93] Schoppa, *Bargaining with Japan*, p. 307.

industrial policy community: an exclusive policymaking institution consisting of a ministry division and a trade association under the division's jurisdiction, sometimes reinforced by corresponding LDP *zoku* politicians.[95] In a policy community with a close and dependent structure, in which ministerial and industrial interests are fused, a ministry division may take the initiative in resisting foreign pressure, even without an explicit request or pressure from the trade association in question.[96] How resistant a policy community is depends on the autonomy of the community, and policy outcomes are greatly affected by the nature of the policy community involved in the process. In this thesis, it is suggested that *the closer an industrial policy community is to what Marsh and Rhodes call the ideal policy community, the more resistant the community becomes to foreign pressure.*[97]

(3) Environmental policy sponsors

The next proposition in this thesis is that *the presence or absence of an effective environmental policy sponsor affects the political process and policy outcome.* Unless there is a politically powerful sponsor, an industrial policy community will probably remain unyielding in the face of foreign

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[94] The economic ministries concerned in this thesis are mainly the Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI); the Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries (MAFF) including the Forestry Agency and the Fisheries Agency.
[95] It should be noted that *zoku* politicians can play the dual role of representing the interests in their respective fields, and of coordinating their interests with others in the LDP's Policy Affairs Research Council (PARC). Relevant to this research are *zoku* politicians specialising in commerce and industry, agriculture and forestry, and fisheries, and the corresponding PARC divisions to which they belong.
[96] Ôtake, *Gendai Nihon no Seiji Kenryoku Keizai Kenryoku,* p. 192 and p. 254.
[97] See Marsh and Rhodes, "Policy Communities and Issue Networks," p. 251. They list the characteristics of polity communities as follows: a very limited number of participants; economic and/or professional interests; frequent interaction; continuity in

pressure, and therefore it is unlikely that that pressure will cause a policy change. As policy sponsors, environmental LDP politicians (*Kankyo Zoku*)[98] and government ministries can directly challenge a policy community.[99] For the present, the Environment Agency and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs are assumed to have become policy sponsors since the former is motivated by the chance to expand its jurisdiction in the government, and the latter tends to attempt to avoid foreign criticism. Compared to an economic ministry in a policy community, which is likely to have the authority to change industrial policy under foreign pressure, these ministries lack political resources, even if they form a network with environmental NGOs, which are also normally much less politically competent than economic interest groups in a policy community.[100] At the same time, however, they can depend on foreign pressure, public opinion, the mass media, and sometimes *Kankyo Zoku*, instead.

The three streams

As Schoppa argues, foreign pressure can affect policy outcomes by influencing the three streams,[101] and by empowering policy entrepreneurs. In this sub-section, it is proposed that *the occurrence of policy change very much depends on how foreign pressure affects the three streams.* For

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membership, values and outcomes; a strong consensus; an exchange relationship; and a positive-sum game.

[98] It is assumed that many of them belong to the Special Committee on Global Environmental Affairs of the LDP's Policy Affairs Research Council.

[99] The Director-Generals of the Environment Agency have been appointed Minister for the Global Environment since July 1989.

[100] Weidner, "Japanese Environmental Policy in an International Perspective," p. 505; and Tani, "The Legislative Process of the Fundamental Law on the Environment," p. 155.

instance, policy change will be highly unlikely to occur if foreign pressure causes a strong backlash in these streams: if people feel they are facing, not an environmental problem, but "Japan bashing"; if a policy community becomes cautious about the intention of foreign actors' alternative specification; or if a nationalistic mood pushes politicians to take countermeasures against foreign pressure. Presented below are Kingdon's accounts of the structures of each stream, and some additional points on foreign pressure that can be added to Kingdon's model for the purpose of this research.

(1) The problem stream

> Problems are brought to the attention of people in and around government by systematic indicators, by focusing events like crises and disasters, or by feedback from the operation of current programs. People define conditions as problems by comparing current conditions with their values concerning more ideal states of affairs, by comparing their own performance with that of other countries, or by putting the subject into one category rather than another.[102]

Foreign pressure is highly likely to increase the recognition of a problem. It should be noted, however, that the same condition can be identified as different types of problem by various actors: for example, as an environmental problem by environmental policy sponsors, as an industrial problem by an industrial policy community, or as an international political problem by the ministry of foreign affairs, and the Prime and Foreign Ministers. Following the logic of Kingdon's model, one can propose that *the recognition of an environmental problem can be facilitated when foreign pressure is linked with systematic indicators (for instance, by issuing reliable scientific data warning of a global environmental crisis), with*

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[101] Schoppa, *Bargaining with Japan*, p. 31.

focusing events (by using environmental disasters to prove a disputed theory), and

with feedback (by sending letters complaining about Japanese environmental policy

to Japan's Prime Minister or to a Japanese embassy). In this sense, not only

foreign governments but also environmental NGOs, foreign and

domestic, can play a significant role in problem recognition in Japan.

(2) The policy stream

> Many ideas are possible in principle, and float around in a "policy primeval soup" in which specialists try out their ideas in a variety of ways - bill introductions, speeches, testimony, papers, and conversation. In that consideration, proposals are floated, come into contact with one another, are revised and combined with one another, and floated again. But the proposals that survive to the status of serious consideration meet several criteria, including their technical feasibility, their fit with dominant values and the current national mood, their budgetary workability, and the political support or opposition they might experience.[103]

Ecological ideas, including environmental ethics and scientific

knowledge about the global environment, play an important role in the

generation of policy proposals in this area. In many of these respects,

Japan was behind other developed countries, especially the United States,

in the late 1980s. This is why NGOs considered environmental education

of the public to be an important strategy for changing Japan's problematic

policy. In order for Japanese institutions to absorb scientific and

technological ideas, attention should be paid to advisory councils set up

by ministers or directors-general who are environmental policy sponsors

or key figures in an industrial policy community.[104]

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[102] Kingdon, *Agendas, Alternatives, and Public Policies*, p. 19.
[103] Ibid., pp. 19-20.
[104] For advisory councils, see, for example, Kasa Kyôko, "Shôchô no Gaikaku Dantai, Gyôkai Dantai, Shimon Kikan," in Nishio Masaru and Muramatsu Michio (eds), *Kôza Gyôseigaku*, 4 (Yuhikaku, Tokyo, 1995), pp. 77-113.

In the case of an industrial policy under foreign pressure, it is assumed that at an early stage environmental ideas and even policy proposals are discussed outside the industrial policy community, most probably by environmental policy sponsors and scientists. Nevertheless, not many of their ideas and policy proposals can survive, for the following reasons: first, they are likely to experience strong opposition from the policy community backed by *zoku* politicians; second, the administrative and budgetary competence for an industrial policy normally resides with the economic ministry in the policy community; and third, outsiders often have difficulty in getting sufficient information on technical feasibility. For these structural reasons, environmental policy sponsors attempt to persuade the policy community to recognise the existence of an environmental problem and the need to seek a solution for it. This recognition is also the very domestic condition that Schoppa suggests is necessary for the effectiveness of "alternative specification," a strategy adopted by foreign actors.[105] According to Kingdon's selection criteria, moreover, the survival of an environmental policy proposal also depends on political factors such as a national mood for policy change, and political opposition to the immobilism of the policy community. Taking these points into account, it can be proposed that *policy change is more likely to happen when foreign pressure can couple the problem and the politics streams to the policy stream.*

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[105] Schoppa, *Bargaining with Japan*, p. 310.

(3) The politics stream

> The political stream . . . is composed of such factors as swings of national mood, administration or legislative turnover, and interest group pressure campaigns. Potential agenda items that are congruent with the current national mood, that enjoy interest group support or lack organized opposition, and that fit the orientations of the prevailing legislative coalitions or current administration are more likely to rise to agenda prominence than items that do not meet such conditions.[106]

As regards the factor of "administration or legislative turnover," Japanese politics was stable between 1987 and 1992 in the sense that Japan was always under LDP rule, although the LDP became a minority party in the House of Councillors in 1989. Thus, two other factors in the political stream, public opinion and bureaucratic politics, need particular attention. First, *the emergence of a more environmentally friendly policy depends on how much foreign pressure affects public opinion on the environment.* It is generally agreed that public concern has put the global environmental issue high on the agenda in many developed countries, and that, in the early 1970s, it did the same for the pollution issue in Japan. For this reason, environmental NGOs often employ strategies to mobilise public support for their causes. In this context, careful attention should also be paid to the role of the mass media in changing the national mood on the global environment.

Next, the question of bureaucratic politics - how environmental policy sponsors interact with an industrial policy community - must be addressed to explain the effect of foreign pressure on this stream. The emergence of a bureaucratic sponsor is expected to lead to bureaucratic politics: this is, in many cases, the process by which the policy sponsor exerts pressure on the economic ministry at the core of the policy

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[106] Kingdon, *Agendas, Alternatives, and Public Policies*, p. 20.

community resisting foreign pressure. In this context, attention should also be paid to the coordinating institutions such as a liaison conference of related ministries, administrative vice-ministers' conference, cabinet-level conference of ministers for global environmental conservation, or cabinet meeting, and to the leadership role of the Prime Minister. Whether policy change will occur or not depends on the effect of this pressuring and coordinating process on the policy community;[107] interministerial or political intervention in the policy community may cause policy change. The proposition presented here is that *foreign pressure is more likely to bring about policy change if an environmental policy sponsor opens up and weakens the industrial policy community in question.* It deserves mentioning that the transformation of the community may also be a direct result of "participation expansion," a strategy of foreign actors elaborated by Schoppa.[108]

Stream coupling with a policy window

Kingdon contends that policy change is more likely to happen when an open policy window gives an impetus to the coupling of the three streams, and that a policy window is "opened either by the appearance of compelling problems or by happenings in the political stream."[109] A policy window opens, for instance, when the global environmental

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[107] One possible result of the pressuring and coordinating process is the emergence of policy sponsors within the policy community involved, which will make policy change more plausible.
Stockwin observes that "some interministerial clashes result in significant changes in policy rather than the inhibition of such changes." Stockwin, "Conclusions," pp. 328-9, in Stockwin et al., *Dynamic and Immobilist Politics in Japan* (University of Hawaii Press, Honolulu, 1988), pp. 325-32.
[108] Schoppa, *Bargaining with Japan*, pp. 40-2.

problem clearly takes a sudden turn for the worse, or when a multilateral environmental conference reaches a political agreement. As to the latter, a spillover effect must also have operated to open a series of policy windows in the global environmental issue area during the period 1987 to 1992, when major international environmental conferences were held one after another.[110] It should be noted that since windows are just opportunities, *the prospect of policy change also depends on whether foreign actors or environmental policy sponsors can make the most of such an opportunity.*

The revised policy window model described above will be applied to five case studies in subsequent chapters. In this way, this thesis will attempt to describe the Japanese policymaking processes seen in the five cases, and then to make analytical generalisations about the policymaking process through which foreign pressure does or does not lead to policy change, by testing the propositions suggested in the model.

(end)

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[109] Kingdon, *Agendas, Alternatives, and Public Policies*, p. 20.
[110] For a spillover effect on the appearances of a policy window, see Ibid., pp. 190-4.