Preface

This volume is the edited minutes of an International Symposium titled “Keep Gendering the Knowledge Economy”, which was held on the 13th November, 2016, at the University of Tokyo. The event was sponsored by the Institute of Social Science (ISS) of the University of Tokyo as the 28th ISS symposium. The purpose of the symposium was to thoroughly analyze from a comparative gender perspective issues such as: how the development of the knowledge economy would change the workplace; and what knowledge is in the first place; how knowledge can serve as the basis of an economy; and how knowledge affects the nature of society; how disparities between social strata, and especially gender-based inequalities, would change in a knowledge economy; and conversely, how gender relations affect the nature of a knowledge economy and society.

A Japanese and expanded version of the book *Gendering the Knowledge Economy*, edited by Sylvia Walby, Heidi Gottfried, Karin Gottschall, and Mari Osawa, was published in August 2016 by Minerva Shobo (publisher), and the symposium took this publication as an opportunity to keep gendering the knowledge economy (the original English version was published in 2007).

It was in 1998 that researchers on gender and work and work-related public policies from the US, UK, Germany and Japan started to organize themselves as a network on globalization, gender and work transformation (GLOW). This joint research was conducted by holding panels where the GLOW members presented their papers at conferences of major academic associations, and having intensive workshop of members before or after those conferences.

The outcome of the joint research was published as a book by Palgrave Macmillan in 2007 under the title of *Gendering the Knowledge Economy, Comparative Perspectives*, and the paperback version was published in 2009. Right after that, contributors from Japan wished to translate the book to Japanese language to have wider readers, and colleagues from the UK, US and Germany welcomed the idea. But partly due to prolonged process of editing the draft translation, it was found that the publication could not be earlier than 2016. The translator/editor of the Japanese version (Mari Osawa) and the publisher thus agreed that Chapter 3 which covered social policies of Japan (written by Osawa) should be replaced by a new paper based on the latest information, and the final chapter should be added to overview socio-economic changes as well as developments of research since 2007.

The contents of the Japanese version are therefore as below.

**Part I Re-conceptualizing the Knowledge Economy, Gender and regulation**

1. Introduction: Theorizing the Gendering or the Knowledge Economy: Comparative Approaches
   *Sylvia Walby*

2. Gender and the Conceptualization of the Knowledge Economy in Comparison
   *Karen Shire*
Part II Comparative Regulation

3 Japan’s Livelihood Security System is Reverse-functioning: Comparative Governance in the 2000s
   Mari Osawa

4 Varieties of Gender Regimes and regulating Gender Equality at Work in the Global Context
   Ilse Lenz

5 Similar Outcomes, Different Paths: The Cross-national Transfer of Gendered Regulations of Employment
   Glenda S. Roberts

Part III Gendering New Employment Forms

6 Self-Employment in Comparative Perspective: General Trends and the Case of New Media
   Karin Gottschall and Daniela Kroos

7 Living and Working Patterns in the New Knowledge Economy: New Opportunities and Old Social Division in the Case of New Media and Care-Work
   Diane Perrons

8 Are Care-Workers Knowledge Workers?
   Makiko Nishikawa and Kazuko Tanaka

9 Who Gets to be a Knowledge Worker? The case of UK Call Centres
   Susan Durbin

10 Restructuring Gendered Flexibility in Organizations: A Comparative Analysis of Call Centres in Germany
   Ursula Holtgrewe

Concluding Chapter: Gender Equality Creates a Sustainable Global Community
   Mari Osawa

At the symposium, leading researchers raised questions and gave comments based on the book, and the editors and authors responded while discussing advances in their research since the publication of the original book. The symposium was supported by associations and projects below.

Japan Association for Feminist Economics/ Society for Study of Working Women/ Gender Subcommittee of Japan Association for Social Policy Studies /Gender Studies Subcommittee of Sociology Committee, Science Council of Japan/ Women’s Action Network : WAN/ 2016-2018 Grant-in-aid for scientific research, Basic research program (A) “Gendering the resilience to disasters and crises: Focus on the comparison of Japan and Germany” (PI : Mari Osawa)
Keep Gendering the Knowledge Economy

How will the development of the knowledge economy change the workplace, and what is knowledge in the first place? How can knowledge serve as the basis of an economy, and how does knowledge affect the nature of society? How will disparities between social strata, and especially gender-based inequalities, change in a knowledge economy? Conversely, how do gender relations affect the nature of a knowledge economy and society?

A Japanese version of Gendering the Knowledge Economy, edited by S. Walby, H. Gottfried, K. Gottschall, and M. Osawa, was recently published (the original English version was published in 2007).

The promotion of knowledge economies and the creation of knowledge societies have become increasingly important challenges around the world. This symposium takes the publication of the Japanese version as an opportunity to thoroughly investigate the issues described above. We hope that all symposium members will join in and deepen our discussion of the issues as the editors and authors of the book respond to comments and questions from leading researchers while discussing advances in their research since the publication of the original book.

Venue: FUKUTAKE Learning Theater, The University of Tokyo
Language: Japanese, English (simultaneous interpretation)

Program

Chair: Mari Osawa (University of Tokyo)

Part I Reading “Gendering the Knowledge Economy (Japanese version)” (13:10-14:00)
Comment
Kumiko Hagiwara (Shimonoseki City University)
Seiichi Matsukawa (Tokyo Gakugei University)

Part II How the authors’ responses? (14:15~15:45)
Panelist
Sylvia Walby (Lancaster University)
Heidi Gottfried (Wayne State University)
Karin Gottschall (University of Bremen)
Mari Osawa (University of Tokyo)
Karen Shire (University of Duisburg-Essen, Ochanomizu University)
Ilse Lenz (University of Bochum)
Glenda S. Roberts (Waseda University)
Makiko Nishikawa (Hosei University)
Kazuko Tanaka (International Christian University)

Part III General discussion and Summary (16:00~17:00)

Supporters:
2016–2018 Grants-in-aid for scientific research, Basic research program (A) “Gendering the resilience to disasters and crises—Focus on the comparison of Japan and Germany” (PI: Mari Osawa) / Japan Association for Feminist Economics / Society for Study of Working Women / Gender Subcommittee of Japan Association for Social Policy Studies / Gender Studies Subcommittee of Sociology Committee, Science Council of Japan / Women’s Action Network : WAN
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Profiles of Speakers

◆ Commentators

Hagiwara, Kumiko

Matsukawa, Seiichi

◆ Editors and Authors

Walby, Sylvia (First editor and author of Chapter 1)
OBE, Distinguished Professor of Sociology, UNESCO Chair of Gender Research, and Director of the Violence and Society UNESCO Centre at Lancaster University. She is a Fellow of the Academy of Social Sciences, UK. She has held positions at the LSE, University of Bristol, University of Leeds and UCLA. She was the founding President of the European Sociological Association. Her research has been funded by the ESRC, European Commission, European Parliament, Council of Europe, and the UN. Recent books include: Crisis, Polity (2015); The Future of Feminism, Polity (2011); and Globalization and Inequalities: Complexity and Contested Modernities, Sage (2009). Personal website: http://www.lancaster.ac.uk/sociology/about-us/people/sylvia-walby.

Gottfried, Heidi (Second editor)
Associate Professor of Sociology at Wayne State University, and Research Ambassador, German

**Gottschall, Karin** (Third editor and co-author of Chapter 6)

**Osawa, Mari** (Forth editor and author of Chapter 3 and Concluding Chapter)
Doctor of Economics, Professor at the Institute of Social Science, University of Tokyo. Member of the Science Council of Japan. She specializes in comparative gender analysis of social policies. She has worked as visiting professor at the Berlin Free University, Ruhr-University of Bochum and Gender and Development Studies Program of Asian Institute of Technology, as well as a Mercator Fellow of DFG (Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft). Her English publications include: Tsujimura, Miyoko, and Mari Osawa (eds.) *Gender Equality in Multicultural Societies: Gender, Diversity, and Conviviality in the Age of Globalization*, Tohoku University Press (2010); *Social Security in Contemporary Japan, A comparative analysis*, Routledge/University of Tokyo Series (2011).

**Lenz, Ilse** (Author of Chapter 4)
Professor em. for Sociology (Social inequality/gender) at the Faculty of Social Science, Ruhr-University Bochum. Main research fields are: gender and interchanging inequalities; gender, work and globalisation; social movements and women’s movements. She has worked as a visiting professor at Tokyo University, Ochanomizu University and Kyoto University. English publications include: Lenz, Ilse, Ullrich, Charlotte; Fersch, Barbara (eds.): *Gender Orders Unbound. Globalisation, Restructuring and Reciprocity*. Leverkusen: Verlag Barbara Budrich (2007). Some articles in Japanese.

**Nishikawa, Makiko** (Co-author of Chapter 8)
D.Phil. in Sociology (University of Oxford), Professor of Organizational Behavior, Graduate School of Business Administration, Hosei University. Her research focuses on gender and work in comparative perspective. She has recently started a research project to study the effects of organizational culture and policies on the employee’s psycho-cognitive integration/disintegration of paid work and care
work. Her recent publications based on this project include, “Women’s Identities and Employment”, “Interface between Market Work and Care Work: From Behavioral, Cognitive and Psychological Perspectives”, both in The Hosei Journal of Business. She is the author of Restructuring Care Work and Care Relations (2008).

Roberts, Glenda S. (Author of Chapter 5)
She obtained her PhD in Anthropology from Cornell University in 1986. After holding research and academic positions in Honolulu from 1988, she has lived and worked in Japan since 1996, first at the University of Tokyo Institute of Social Sciences, and then, from 1998 to the present, at the Graduate School of Asia-Pacific Studies of Waseda University, where she is a professor. She has held visiting professorships at the University of Vienna, Department of East Asian Studies and the Free University of Berlin. Her major areas of research are gender, work, family, and migration policy in contemporary Japan. She is co-editor with Satsuki Kawano and Susan Long of the book Capturing Contemporary Japan: Differentiation and Uncertainty, University of Hawaii Press (2014). Her most recent (September 2016) publication can be downloaded here: Japan’s Evolving Family: Voices from Young Urban Adults Navigating Change by Glenda S. Roberts East-West Center (2016).

Shire, Karen (Author of Chapter 2)
PhD Sociology, Chair of Comparative Sociology, University Duisburg-Essen and Specially Appointed Professor, Institute of Global Leadership, Ochanomizu University. Her research focusses on social institutional change and its consequences for social inequalities, especially gender and class inequalities. Recent work focusses on the emergence of cross-border labor markets at the intersection of labor and capital flows within the regional contexts of East/South East Asia and Europe and on the transformation of the German and Japanese gender regimes in relation to the social reorganization of care, the increasing dualization of women’s employment and rising vulnerabilities to exploitation experienced especially by migrant women in both countries. Her recent publications include Flexibility and Employment (Juventa 2015 in German, coauthored), “Family Supports and Insecure Work,” Social Politics, vol. 22:2 (2015).
Part I Reading “Gendering the Knowledge Economy (Japanese version)”

Mari Osawa

We would now like to begin the 28th ISS International Symposium titled “Keep Gendering the Knowledge Economy.” My name is Mari Osawa, University of Tokyo, Institute of Social Science.

I would first like to introduce you the Institute of Social Science as its current Director. The ISS was established in 1946 in reflection on the bitter experience of the war and the shortcomings of social science research in pre-war Japan, with the aim of furthering the construction of “democratic and peace-loving nation” by promoting empirical social science based on systematic collection of data and conducting comparative studies of the high academic standards. This year thus marks the 70th anniversary of the establishment of the ISS.

The years 2014 and 2015 marked a turning point for ISS as constitutional democracy, academic freedom, university autonomy, and social science research and education were all called into question. Firstly in September 2015, the national security related laws were legislated by violating the constitutional and democratic procedure. I think this questions the existence of Institute of Social Science itself.

Secondly in June 2015, the Minister of Education, Culture, Sport, Science and Technology (MEXT) abruptly announced ‘the review of the organization and overall operations of national university corporations’. In particular, MEXT asked national universities to take ‘active steps to abolish undergraduate faculties on teacher training, humanities and social sciences or to drastically reconstruct them to serve fields that better meet society’s needs’, in light of ‘the decrease of the university-age population, the demand for human resources and the quality control of research and teaching institutions and the function of national universities.’

The MEXT announcement was communicated outside Japan, and I received some inquiries around this from my friends including Prof. Heidi Gottfried, one of today’s panelists. The University of Tokyo itself has made clear that it would “further revitalize the humanities and social sciences through active support of outstanding research in those fields” in the “UTokyo Vision 2020”, which was decided in October 2015 as a vision for the next 6 years. University of Tokyo is fine in this sense, but if you look at other national universities outside of metropolitan area in particular, undergraduate programs for teachers’ training, humanity studies and economics have been reviewed and actually converted to those programs for community development, sightseeing and leisure activities for instance. This is a very worrying situation for humanities and social sciences as a whole in Japan, where national universities are scarce higher education institutions in local areas, since private universities are concentrated in a few metropolitan areas.

Under such circumstances, the ISS is to promote social sciences in Japan through not only conducting quality research and publications, but also holding public seminars and symposiums for citizens, offering infrastructure such as digital data archive for social scientific studies to undergraduate students, and we are to make utmost effort towards these ends. As a part of the mission of ISS, this international symposium is being publicly held thanks to your cooperation and support.

This event is actually supported by several organizations shown in the flyer. The Women’s
Action Network (WAN) is one of them and they are video recording the symposium. At the very back of this room, the president of WAN, Professor Chizuko Ueno is present to operate the recording device.

As a facilitator of the symposium, I would like to proceed. Part I is the ‘Reading Gendering the Knowledge Economy in Japanese Version,’ and we have two commentators for this part. Now let me call upon Professor Hagiwara Kumiko from Shimonoseki City University.

Kumiko Hagiwara

The Social Organization of Work in the Knowledge Economy as Captured by Case Studies

Thank you very much for the introduction. The role that I am to fulfill is to share the arguments of the case studies in this book. Firstly, I would like to give you an overall review of the case studies and their findings, and then, I would like to share my questions and arguments.

[Introduction – 2016 and the significance of this book]

First of all, I am honored to review “Gendering the Knowledge Economy,” which has finally been translated into Japanese and released this year (2016). The book containing this international research that focused upon the United States and the UK, Germany, and Japan was actually published nearly 10 years ago. However, the basic framework and the perspectives through gender lenses in understanding the knowledge economy remains universal and provocative. Especially this year, we will find how significant this book is because 2016 is somehow the year of a new phase in the development of the knowledge economy.

As we all know, at the World Economic Forum annual meeting in Davos, there was a discussion about the fourth industrial revolution, making use of artificial intelligence, and the WEF released a report titles The Future of Jobs. There were some bilateral agreements for building overseas cooperation, such as the joint statement on IoT/Industry 4.0 between the Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry (METI) of Japan and the Federal Ministry for Economic Affairs and Energy (BMWi) of Germany. Also, with the fourth industrial revolution as its spark, the Abe administration launched the Japan Revitalization Strategy 2016, which sets a goal of achieving a nominal GDP of ¥600 trillion.

When we look at these movements, especially within the framework of the Japan Revitalization Strategy of the Japanese Government, we can find the same problematique in the relations of gender and the knowledge economy as stated in Professor Walby’s chapter (Chapter 1).

In their story of GDP growth, knowledge is assumed to be something that contributes to the economic growth of the nation. The role of the nation in this project is to stimulate knowledge production to bring about innovation in leading-edge technology and the (re)production of human capital with high talent. Such industries are positioned at the high end, and knowledge and technology are also supposed to stimulate the face-to-face service industries such as tourism, medical care and nursing care.

Professor Walby in her chapter sets out a framework that cuts to the core of such an industrial organization under the knowledge economy driven society, focusing on how the two intrinsic vectors of regulations are functioning in the gendering, re-gendering, and de-gendering processes of labor and the
structure of employment. One vector concerns the deregulation of labor in temporalities, spatialities and contractualities. The other vector is stronger regulations to redress gender discrimination and disparities. Of course, how those two vectors weave society differs with the varieties of capitalism and the gender regime in each country. Taking an example from the Japan Revitalization Strategy, there we can find intersections of the two vectors which are not in harmony with each other. One is to strengthen the regulations over gender discrimination, such as providing more childcare services, restricting measures against long working hours to promote women's labor participation, and to meet the demand of the aging and depopulating society. Another is to deregulate the temporalities, spatialities and contractualities seen in the discussion of the new labor law, promotion of teleworking, and so on.

Another important element suggested by the framework of this book is that the employment structure in the new economy consists of both old and new service industries and is accompanied by uneven spatial development and gendered disparity in both old and new forms. For example, Kochi Prefecture, suffering both depopulation and population aging, hit a record high ratio for job openings to job applicants in 2016. Although the administration announced this as a successful example of the Japan Revitalization Strategy, the true story was that a shortage of labor due to depopulation brought about a decrease in the number of job seekers and part-time job openings in the service industry. On the contrary, in the global city of Tokyo, there is a concentration of highly-skilled workers who work for the growing high-tech industries with cutting-edge knowledge in IoT (Internet of Things), Big Data and AI. They have created a face-to-face industry to sustain their personal lives and the government is now implementing a policy to bring in care workers from small rural towns and provincial cities which have suffered the hollowing out of industry, as well as from overseas.

Authors of the book approach such tensions created at the intersection of varieties of gender regimes and varieties of capitalism in the process of the development of the knowledge economy. In their international comparison, they share the same point of view regarding the path to gender equality in this huge social change through a rich policy analysis and case studies. One major characteristic of this achievement is, as I have mentioned, based on the broad range of the international comparison. However, I would like to give more attention to the case studies in the third section of the book, since this is another major characteristic. How should we view and analyze gendering, re-gendering, de-gendering processes of the employment and work at the intersection of varieties of gender regimes and varieties of capitalisms? As in the remarks in the chapter by Professor Shire, “Understanding gendering processes requires a qualitative and longitudinal approach, which combines institutional and organizational analyses with a micro-sociological perspective on gendering processes in workplace practice” (Chapter 2, Karen Shire). I would like to cover these case studies and try to map them onto the picture of the world of work in the knowledge economy.

[Transition to the knowledge economy and the reproduction of old gender relations]
What is the knowledge economy? How is it defined here in this research? Professor Shire approaches the knowledge economy as a specific industrial sector from the standpoint of important questions regarding gender-based occupational and market segregation. To measure the employment of the new economy, she categorizes the industry as the economic activities utilizing information and high information-processing technology as a major management resource and incorporating them into means of production, and provides us with an interesting sketch of the gendered new economy.
According to the UN, EU and OECD, which have developed measures to capture economic development and its change, the knowledge economy could be understood as the industries consisting of three sectors; the ICT sector, information sector and KIS (knowledge-intensive sector). She recalculated the employment data regarding those sectors based on the ISCO and revealed that the gender proportions in those sectors are similar in the United States, the UK, Germany and Japan, in spite of the fact that the pace of progress in the related industries differs among the four countries.

These sketches depicted by Professor Shire show very clear gender patterns in the new economy. Firstly, men are concentrated in the high technology sector of ICT. Secondly, in the information sector, especially in the contents industry, the proportion of women is high and they are working as self-employed, freelance, and temporary workers. Thirdly, job segregation is clear in the KIS sector; men are concentrated in the high technology and transit, finance industry, while women concentrate in the face-to-face service industry and in such sectors as education, social work or in low-skill jobs, such as in the insurance industry.

While it seems that people with education and high-level skills geared to the emerging fields of the new economy will have better job prospects regardless of gender, we now know that the transition to the knowledge economy is not autonomous and independent from the existing gender relations at all. We still live with the gender relations in the old industrial economy and the pattern of gendered job classification in the industrial economy is reproduced in the process of transition to the knowledge-based economy.

Meanwhile, Professor Perrons attempts to conceptualize the new economy as social change by paying attention to the dual nature of knowledge goods and taking in both optimistic and pessimistic arguments regarding the new economy (Chapter 7, Diane Perrons). Knowledge goods are infinitely expansible and non-contestable, and they can be replicated at very low minimum cost. This nature generates greater equality in accessibility. However, the first product of knowledge goods is enormously costly. Companies strive to lock consumers into their particular brand and these producers and workers capture an increasing share of the market.

Correspondingly, Professor Perrons argues that social and spatial disparities expand, even with stricter regulations on working conditions and gender disparity. The new economy based on knowledge goods and new technologies strengthen the existing occupational gender pattern and employment structure as well as the disparities among women. These arguments are substantiated in her case study in Bright and Hove by surveying the “knowledge workers” in the new media industry at the high end of the employment hierarchy and childcare workers at the low end of it.

[Mapping the traditional women’s work in new economy]

Now, the question is how the new economy internalizes the mechanisms of reproduction of gender segregation and gendered disparity, and how it works in terms of gendering, re-gendering, or de-gendering the pattern of work. In the third part of the book, the authors carried out various case studies focusing on two traditional women’s jobs which are an integral part of the structure of the new economy. One is the operators at call centers of the finance industry in the KIS sector, with a comparison between the UK and Germany. The other looks at care workers as interpersonal service also in the KIS sector, especially home healthcare workers in Japan. I would like to start with the analysis by Susan Durbin (Chapter 9), which focuses on the process of encoded knowledge production and its
managerial organization at the huge call centers of two banks in the UK.

She notes that there are 100 work shift patterns at the call center to meet the 24-hour demands of the customers, and analyzes the labor process of operators with the interface of customers via ICT machines. Operators provide the interactive service in accordance with the coded knowledge regulated by the management, and in the process of supporting customers, they are actually collecting information on customers regarding the sales product and the services they sell. All the data operators accumulate in the process is passed up to the senior managers via the middle managers, and the data is processed and analyzed to convert it into encoded and collective knowledge by the management.

Senior managers, and almost all of the middle managers consist of men, and they monopolize the process of formulating the encoded and embedded knowledge and incorporating it into the business structure. Embodied and embedded knowledge operators, consisting of women, will not bring women higher up in the hierarchy of the business. What we see here is the exclusion of women in the process of formation of collective knowledge (encoded knowledge) in management structures or “production control,” with path dependency, or the same old story of technology and women.

On the other hand, taking the example of call centers at the private bank in Germany, Ursula Holtgrewe (Chapter 10) found both gendering and de-gendering patterns of jobs at call centers in accordance with the expansion of electronic trading in financial services and interactive services in the banking industry.

According to her research, patterns of gendering or new patterns of job segregation are found in the technical hotlines regarding private banking. The job at the newly set up hotline is supposed to require a high level of knowledge and operators are linked to the traditionally masculine notions of technology and skill, following traditional gender distinctions. Interestingly, women need to work with the observance of a masculine code of knowledge as newcomers to professionalism and workers with less constraint from care responsibilities.

De-gendering patterns emerge when the management pursues the utmost efficiency and cost-cutting in the flexibility of the labor organization. In this case, university students, who are a more flexible workforce, take the place of middle-aged or elderly women part-timers with higher skills through the job training system in Germany. In pursuing efficiency and cost-cutting, housework and childcare, which were once the reasons for hiring female part-time workers, are now construed as restrictions on working time. They began to hire university students, regardless of gender this time, since they are a more “flexible” work force, to meet their management strategy. The process of decoupling gender and flexibility also means the downgrading of middle-aged or elderly women’s skills and flexibility at work is de-gendered. We also grasp the implied meaning of gendered intersectionality of age and technology and the exclusion of middle aged and senior women in the same process.

Makiko Nishikawa and Kazuko Tanaka (Chapter 8) challenge the concept of ICT-led “knowledge” of the 90s onward, attempting to reposition homecare workers as “knowledge workers” by focusing on tacit knowledge gained in daily practice. The majority of home care workers are middle aged women working as part-timers, and haken, or dispatched workers, and accordingly they are removed from the synchronic solidarity based on the work experience, as well as the work community where they can share their knowledge and skills as a professional group. They argue that the flexibility of time, space and employment contracts in the care industry “prevents homecare workers from becoming fully-fledged knowledge workers,” since employment flexibility deprives workers of the opportunity
for the conversion of tacit knowledge to formal knowledge.

In this way, tacit knowledge regarding homecare work is not handled as something to be converted into explicit knowledge, and homecare work is unable to extricate itself from an evaluation as ancillary work. It is also suggested that the breakout would offer more opportunities for communication with colleagues as well as implementation of OJT at every occasion. On whether such an approach from human resource management could be sufficiently effective or not, I’d like to return to the topic later on in further detail.

[New media freelancers and gendered risk]
Meanwhile, the authors also went into the world of workers in the new media industry; both freelancers and self-employed at the high end of the new economy. How do they live with the flexibilities of temporalities, spatialities and contractualities? Karin Gottschall and Daniela Kroos (Chapter 6, Germany), Diane Perrons (Chapter 7, UK) explore their daily practices of managing opportunities and risks as one of the characteristics of the new media industry.

In general, freelancers with a high skill level are satisfied with their work and the way of life which gives them autonomy in organizing their work and lives. However, their daily practice in organizing work and life also constitutes the daily interpenetration of the private and public spheres as well as the erosion of time and space by work time, which cause tensions among the family sharing the same time and space.

They also live their lives with the fundamental risks embedded in a rapidly changing market, where there are demand fluctuations as well as uncertain career prospects. Corresponding to the rapid development of ICT, they are always facing the risk of technological obsolescence. Since new media industry has been developing without establishing concrete work rules, those ever-increasing self-employed and freelancers live with small-scale social security and protection as workers.

Nevertheless, self-employed workers still accept the risk as the inherent nature of the industry and try to manage individually. In these practices and processes, Gottschall and Kroos found significant gender difference in the nature of their personal risk management. Informal personal networks are a crucial resource for risk management for workers in the media industry since highly evaluated projects are often offered via such a network and this eventually fosters career formation with a high market value. This means that the existence of networks such as old-boy networks leads women into a disadvantageous situation. However, such a gender disadvantage tends to be understood as personal failure in cultures that have prevailing individualistic or meritocratic discourses in this industry.

Many freelancers reduce economic and social risks by being young, single households or dual-earner (dual-career) households. At the same time, the image of the “individualized autonomous freelancer” makes family responsibility something to be managed as individual risk. Needless to say, gender really works behind the scenes and gender really matters.

[Some Comments and Arguments]
I would like to move on to the discussion. Taking this opportunity, I am very much looking forward to hearing new findings the authors may have generated over the past 10 years.

Firstly, I would like to pick up some of the issues regarding the reproduction of the old gender division of labor and the reproduction of the gendered patterns of disparities associated with the
development of the new economy. As we found in the case studies, the unequal gender structure is an integral part of the social change accompanying the development of new economy, and it has even strengthened the disparities across gender and class.

To cope with gendered gaps and crises embedded in this process, we have strong arguments regarding regulations here in this book. Professor Osawa revealed the dysfunction of livelihood security policy in Japan through the international comparison of policy effects at the government level (Mari Osawa, Chapter 3). Professor Lenz shed light on the influence of women’s movements in VOC and analyzed the policy processes that generate national-level regulations on gender equality (Ilse Lenz, Chapter 4). Professor Roberts showed us the importance of the role of the government in reconciling work and family in the global economy, drawing the intersection of the foreign corporate culture and Japanese work-family regulations, as well as that of the Japanese domestic corporate culture (Glenda S. Roberts, Chapter 5)

Meanwhile, on the micro level or at the workplace, how can we cope with the process of the gendering patterns of disparities associated with the development of the new economy? Are there any possible formations of mobilizing structures or agencies within the practices at the workplaces as the gender arena in the new economy? Can we find new formations of counter forces or resistance against the process of “knowledge” production on the macro level which expands gendered poverty? Would it be possible to simultaneously attain autonomous labor and gender equality? Regarding these questions, I would like to argue the following points.

Firstly, we now acknowledge that high level digital information processing technology and the algorithm are important bases for the modes of production in the knowledge economy and its industrial sector. This means that the activities conducted by care workers and operators in call centers are also incorporated into the process of production and are controlled under those technologies. Through such a process, their personal or tacit knowledge is always open to conversion into formal knowledge in a way that fits in with the purpose of corporations.

Acknowledging such relationships between the labor process and the existing knowledge production, it would not be subversive for the existing unequal gender relations and capitalisms in new economy even if the tacit knowledge of women in the reproductive sphere were to be evaluated as explicit or formal knowledge within the present gendered knowledge economy. As seen in the case of the introduction of the Long-Term Care Insurance scheme in Japan, incorporation of tacit knowledge into the body of formal knowledge means grading the knowledge within the existing gendered hierarchy of knowledge. When the tacit knowledge and the expertise of homecare workers were incorporated into the body of knowledge in the medical and healthcare field, they were positioned at the bottom of the knowledge hierarchy with the medical doctors at the top.

Also, what I found in the case studies by Durbin, and Tanaka and Nishikawa, is something that could be called the dilemma of tacit knowledge, or the trap of formal knowledge. Their case studies implied that the mode of knowledge production itself includes the mechanism of gender reproduction. In call centers, operators try to manage their encounters with customers by mobilizing their tacit knowledge through interfaces with machines. What we find here is that an interactive work has, from the outset, embedded the labor process to provide their tacit knowledge to the management through technology.

On the other hand, homecare workers obtain and accumulate their tacit knowledge in the
process of their relational work for certain customers. Tacit knowledge in this relational work, for homecare workers, means the intimacy they have with certain customers. At the same time, for homecare workers with flexible but unstable employment contracts as part-time workers or dispatched workers, tacit knowledge connected with the intimacy with certain customers is the resource that gives rise to the guarantee of continued employment, as well as the resource of recognition. Thus, the enclosure of tacit knowledge by workers could be interpreted as a form of resistance against knowledge management and the control of labor.

However, here we find the dilemma of tacit knowledge. If the conversion of tacit knowledge to informal knowledge is the way for homecare workers to become full-fledged knowledge workers, as in the arguments by Tanaka and Nishikawa, it would be self-destructive to keep their tacit knowledge within the personal relations with certain customers. While at the same time, if they give out their knowledge to the formal management process, it would be also self-destructive because it would lead to further deskilling and standardizing of care work, as in the way the care industry, or the labor-intensive and low-margin service sector finds more profitable and efficient. It might cause a further devaluation of care work in the labor market.

Secondly, regarding labor relations and collective bargaining, or the issue of the representation of workers in new economy, authors bring up new possibilities as well as some conflicting trends.

In the case of the UK, or in the Liberal market economy, Perrons indicates that workers in the new media industry consider informal individual negotiations more important than collective bargaining, and in general, they do not see the relevance of trade unions for the ICT sector. Meanwhile, in Germany, the coordinated labor market, where they maintain the institutional infrastructure of the industrial relations system based on social partnership with guild-like professional organization traditions, Gottschall and Kroos found new potential in the Verdi task force in Connexx-AV, the major trade union of the service industries. Verdi is a network of freelancers in the new media industry affiliated with the traditional trade union, and the network formation displays the hybrid model geared both to freelance individualism and collective negotiating capabilities.

While industrial relations in Germany have institutional conditions based on social partnership, and the levels of union density do not directly affect the power of influence, in the UK, United States, and Japan, industrial relations are decentralized at the company level, and the downward density directly leads to a decline in the power of influence. Even under such conditions and declining union density in the UK, as in the case of the strike led by childcare workers, Perrons focused on the validity and effectiveness of the institutional framework of industrial relations for individually segmented workers. It is also suggested that the consequence of the wage campaign at the local level by UNISON, the trade union of public workers, would benefit nursery workers in the private sector.

However, after the financial crisis of 2008, in pursuing fiscal austerity and under-taking the adjustment of the public sector, social services with a high concentration of women workers have been curtailed as unprofitable departments. We have seen the privatization of social services as well as a reduction of employment in the public sector all over the world. That trend has been accelerated in Europe. In the United States, as seen in the case of Wisconsin, the public workers’ trade union has been facing strong union bashing to limit the right of collective bargaining. Also in Japan, public workers have gone through reductions in salary several times. There is the case in which the salary of nursery teachers in the public sector was reduced to the low pay rates of the teachers in the private
sector. Regarding the VOC, and gender regimes, what is the role of the public? Again, what kind of possible mobilizing structure or strategies for workers can we think of in this developmental process of the knowledge economy, the fourth industrial revolution?

Thirdly, and the final question, I’d like to ask for your ideas about the relationship between employment and social security in the knowledge economy. What kind of welfare provisions should we formulate, especially when we think about personal risk management and the unstable working conditions of freelancers depicted in the case studies. How can the existing social security respond to the new types of “employment”? If the increase in freelancers is inevitable from now on, should we decouple employment and social security, and head for the full-fledged introduction of basic income? Or, should we rather enhance or improve activation policy? If so, would there be any ways to counter the technological progress accompanying the disruptive innovations? How can we secure the acquisition of skills, avoiding a cat and mouse game in the midst of the progress of ICT?

There is much more to discuss, such as the gender context of flexibilities through international comparisons, the issue of the selective acceptance of immigrants and gender. However, I think I should wrap it up for now. Thank you very much for your kind attention.

Mari Osawa
Thank you very much, Professor Hagiwara. Within the limited time, you have made comments on many of the chapters in the book, and also a big question concerning the entire book. Thank you very much for your comments.

Now from the Tokyo Gakugei University, we are joined by Professor Seiichi Matsukawa. Professor Matsukawa, please.

Seiichi Matsukawa (presentation material at the symposium is in pp.82-86 below)
Good afternoon, ladies and gentlemen. Thank you very much for the kind introduction. My name is Seiichi Matsukawa, from Tokyo Gakugei University. Due to time and my capability constraints, I shall not review the entire content of each chapter of this book for introduction as Professor Hagiwara did in a comprehensive manner, but instead I would like to focus on the theoretical framework. As I’m a member of the Japan and the International Association for Feminist Economics, today I’d like to talk about how I can critically read this book in a feminist economics perspective.

This presentation consists of two sections; first, let me begin with making clear the theoretical basic theme in feminist economics. I think it includes three motifs. The first motif concerns the concept of “extended economy.” Feminist economics does not limit the concept of the economy to the productive domain which is directly related to the process of capital accumulation, but it understands the economy in such a manner as it includes the reproductive domain of human beings as well. It follows that the interaction between the two domains, productive and reproductive, is regarded as a critical subject matter for feminist economist research. In recent years, based on the increasing autonomy of the financial domain, the scope of feminist economist research is expanding so as to involve new relationships between the financial and the reproductive domain.

The second motif, I think this is common to all feminist arguments, is that the gender inequality
is closely related to asymmetric gender relations in the economy. In other words, feminist economics insists that it is of importance to clarify the material foundation of gender inequality. These aforementioned motifs also lead to fundamental critique against the orthodoxy, neoclassical and Marxist economics.

The third and the final motif of feminist economics pays attention to theorizing the three sub-domains of the economy so as to essentially embrace the complexity of multi-spatial scale, which leads from the micro level in the sense of intrahousehold bargaining process among individuals through the mezzo level of family and household unit, and the national level to the global level. Hence, the national economy as a spatial unit for analysis does not necessarily offer an adequate theoretical reference point for feminist economics. The spatiality of contemporary capitalism shows the hybridity of global and local elements and the hybridity is reflected in gender relations as well.

In the second half of my presentation, I will talk about some topics of the book a little further in detail. We would like to consider the issue of how knowledge exists in the economy and capital accumulation. Here we point out that the theory of knowledge economy is confined to the issue of knowledge in the productive domain, and that gender relations are ignored and concealed in such a knowledge structure. This is the point I would like to make. The analysis of the transformation of the manner in which knowledge exists has led us to feminist critique which recognizes that knowledge in the contemporary capitalist economy has been already gendered in and of itself. While the cognitive competence of human beings is considered as an engine of productive force and knowledge is dealt with as an object for investment, the role of non-cognitive competence in the reproductive domain is revisited and the transformation of gender relations in the productive and reproductive domain is taking place. This current situation is to be discussed.

Let me talk further into the content. Economics has been focusing on the market and the commoditization of labor that produces commodity. There is almost no difference among neoclassical economics, classical economics and Marxist economics at this point. In other words, in such an academic tradition the economy refers to the domain of paid work and its deliverables. The orthodoxy hardly pays attention to how products are consumed is an issue of leisure time and how consumption behaviors reproduce labor. Or even if the attention is paid to, the effort was not to develop a grounded theory.

It was Marxist feminism in the 1970s that criticized such approaches as taken by orthodox economics on the basis of the concept of unpaid work. A body of researches was conducted and resulted in what was later called the domestic labor debate. Soon beyond the realm of household work, it began to investigate non-commercialized domain as a whole including reproductive process, and then developed the concept of the extended economy. Today’s feminist economics is undoubtedly the successor of this academic legacy.

Based on the concept of expanded economy, irrespective of paid or unpaid, feminist economics has been always demonstrating strong concerns with how people’s work gets an evaluation and how work is allocated amongst people in gender relationship. It is a myth of the modern society that economic activities are performed by self-standing, rational economic man with free-will. In fact, economic activities are deployed in gender relations with norms and power, and are sustained by gender relations, and are also activities that reproduce gender relation per se. Such are the arguments of feminist economics.

Wage disparity between men and women and the gender division of labor are the examples
where gender order in the economy is most clearly visible. A significant disparity of male-female ratio from the macro industrial level to the micro intrafirm level is not the reflection of skills and capabilities of individual workers. Feminist economics problematizes in terms of gender relationship how the capabilities which is demanded to be evaluated as a good worker are shaped and, in the first place, what the capabilities to be evaluated are.

The fundamental element of wealth in the capitalist society is commodities. The access to paid work gives rise to the material foundation of power relationship. To the contrary, this means that a provider of non-marketized care has a restricted access to such wealth in this society. Provisioning of paid and unpaid work is constructed on the basis of power relations, and at the same time that produces power relation per se.

The modern society has a tendency to separate the productive and the reproductive domain in the organizational and the spatial dimension alike. The modern family plays a critical role in the reproductive domain. The capitalist relations of production cannot produce labor power commodity in a direct manner. It is normalized at the state level that the gendered modern family should have responsibility to the reproduction of labor power. However, because of economic instability inherent in the capitalist relations of production such as cyclical depression as well as insecure family formation due to the so-called romantic-love ideology on marriage, the modern family cannot necessarily undertake reproductive process in a stable and secure manner. In other words, “the failure of family” is not exceptional. The modern state which gave birth to the modern family has no choice but to systematically deploy social policies in order to compensate the failure of modern family. That is the welfare state as the livelihood security system managed by the state.

When the modern family is constituted on the basis of the gender division of labor, the dysfunction of the reproductive process appears as a crisis of the male breadwinner model. Under the Fordist regime of capital accumulation, the stabilization of reproductive process was at first addressed by de-commoditization policy of male paid workers. And then the crisis in the family formation process based on the modern family model demanded the social policy concerning whether or not the provisioning of care should be handled with by a social system other than the modern family.

It has been pointed out that diversity of labor regulations results in the diversity of capitalist economies. Walby points this out in her chapter of the book (Chapter 1). Looking from a standpoint of feminist economics, in contrast, its relationship with the variety of gendered welfare regimes in which the state has deep commitment to how people should live a life and how people should reproduce their own labor power through policy implementation.

The modern state, in particular, the post-war Keynesian welfare state has functioned as the stabilizer against uncertainties in the productive and the reproductive domain. That has led to the situation where the nation-state seems like a self-evident research unit to analyze both productive and reproductive domain. In addition, the differences amongst nations continue to exist and the cause of the differences has been often sought in the variety of historical preconditions for the productive and the reproductive domain in each country and the pass-dependent developmental trajectories of social systems. In the book Gendering the Knowledge Economy, many contributors of the book applied comparative analysis by country. However, feminist economics seems to hold a kind of criticism against the assumption of nation-state as a spatial unit for analysis. This may have something to do with the fact that feminist economics has been for a long time interested in not only the Global North
but also the Global South. For instance, Ester Boserup’s book was published in the 1970s, and it has a place as a classic in the feminist economics literature.

The world-system theory approach in a broader sense urges us to think about the uniqueness of the developmental trajectory of advanced industrialized countries situated by their positions in the world-system. The phenomenon called the ‘Rise of Knowledge Economy’ can be understood as part of the spatial rearrangement of capital accumulation at the world-system level since the 1970s. The rise of knowledge economy was most prominently manifested not at the national level, but at the sub-national spatial level of industrial district.

Global cities which are one of such regional economic spaces constitute the global hierarchical network of cities. Also defamilization strategy of the welfare state to address the failure of family in the reproductive domain pushed for the externalization of care services in various forms. The care services tend to be supplied by international migrants. This means that the reproductive domain is also globalizing at the micro level.

In her chapter Sylvia Walby called for attention on new spatiality, contractuality, and temporality of employment relations (Chapter 1), and these should provide us with important issues for discussion concerning the whole extended economy including the reproductive domain. Gendering the Knowledge Economy was first published in 2007 in its original English version. Immediately after its publication, global financial crisis took place, triggered by the collapse of the US subprime mortgage market and the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers. Naturally, due to publication timing, this book doesn’t mention the current phase of capitalist economy since then, but there is no question about the fact that financial sector is a main pillar of knowledge economy.

One of the major issues for feminist economists during the past decade has been how the financial domain, which is relatively becoming more autonomous apart from the productive domain, is forming relationship with the reproductive domain. Gendering of financial relations is the theme that requires further research. I’m interested in how the authors of this book will discuss this theme during today’s symposium.

Now, I would like to shed light on the knowledge-based economy which is the key concept of this book. The word “knowledge economy” seems peculiar when we take a close look of it because the word tacitly denies a common sense perception that no economic activities exist without knowledge. In other words, knowledge economy is a discourse with the value judgement that emphasizes a particular kind of knowledge distinguished from generic knowledge in the economic sphere. Certainly in the knowledge economy, when you deal with important knowledge, it refers to knowledge that contributes to capital accumulation. In the 1970s, a specific part of economic activities began to be called knowledge economy probably because information was no longer used only to generate wealth, but information per se was traded as commodity in order to generate massive wealth.

Such a situation emerged due to the digitalization of information and the dramatic development of information processing technologies on the basis of digitalized information. As quoted in chapter 7 by Perrons, Core says that material basis on which knowledge becomes tradable goods, although in fictitious form, is the informationalization of knowledge in the sense of making knowledge into bits-and-bytes form.

The production of knowledge in the bits-and-bytes form relies on information industry in a broad sense, which is an icon of the emerging knowledge economy. The labor process of the industry
comprises the cognitive operation to a bits-and-bytes form of information. Now let me call these workers engaged in such an operation as a symbolic analyst, following Robert Reich.

Symbolic analysts are those who are engaged in the work to produce new symbols through analysis, integration, and conversion of symbols. The object of their work is not limited to symbols in a narrow sense such as composed of digital codes on computer but includes symbolic knowledge which could be digitalized someday as well. The operation of symbols requires relatively complex cognitive competence, and the knowledge economy depends much on it. That is what the theory of knowledge-based society is about.

In that theory of knowledge economy, the cognitive competence of human beings per se becomes labor which is to work on the bits-and-bytes form of information. In modern times, labor as the objectification of the nature and its modification by the mind occupies a privileged position and gives rise to a ground for justifying the private possession of deliverables of one’s labor. But some human activities do not fit into this category of labor, one of which is care in a broader sense. In the framework where a human conduct is deemed as labor, product as a result of labor is supposed to be the externalization of the mind of a laborer. In that sense, such product is a part of alter-ego of a laborer and is under the control of the laborer, in other words, private property. However, caring is not confined in such a framework because the result of caring is the transformation of the situation through interactions between the carer and the cared-for. It is difficult to identify a causal relationship in the result of caring as well as to attribute the result to the mind or the intention of carer. The characteristic of the gender order in the modern society is to exclude caring activities in the society from the productive domain and economic domain as non-labor and to assign marginalized care work to women. The concept of labor is in itself taking on analytical masculinity, whether it is undertaken by a biological woman or man.

Under the Fordist regime of capital accumulation, the productive domain consisting of labor and the reproductive domain consisting of care get separated both temporally and spatially. However, under the post-Fordist regime, the borderline between the productive and the reproductive domain has been re-shaped; it is the global city to emerge in the most drastic form of the tendency. The economy of global city is driven by corporate services, particularly the financial sector. Global city is the unique agglomeration of knowledge economy, and is an economic space which emerged as part of the restructuring process of special division of labor in a world scale, that is, the shift from the Fordist to the post-Fordist regime of accumulation. In work on a belt conveyor, the symbol of the Fordism, the ideal of the work lies in keeping the same work environment as much as possible and completing the pre-allocated tasks in silence. On the other hand, the post-Fordist knowledge economy consists of tasks to respond and adapt to ever-changing unstable work environment, and it is normal to have conversations in such a workplace. Symbolic analysts also hold communications as they sell his or her cognitive competence.

As seen in the ICT sector, typical jobs of knowledge economy are male dominant. It is visibly gendered. The gender bias in higher education, which develops a particular type of cognitive competence required for job execution in a specific field, is one of the most important factors. The number of female students who study at STEM departments of the university is small and this trend results directly in the low ratio of female employment in the ICT sector. It is also a result of gendered tracking effect in primary and secondary education.
Secondly, jobs of symbolic analysts make progress through mutual presentations of their interpretation of symbols. This demands an occupational community functioning as interpretive community of symbols. If such interpretive community should strengthen the tendency of male homo-sociality, it would be difficult for a woman to join, and even if she is allowed to join, such a female worker has to cast her identity as a functionally masculine subject.

Another point that characterizes the economy of global cities is the agglomeration of personal services work for the reproduction of symbolic analysts. Not limited to global cities, but in the post-Fordist regime of accumulation, the reproductive domain is under transformation to the productive domain. The content of interpersonal services work is characterized by caring elements. Generally speaking, its wage level is low and employment conditions are poor. Although care-type work is essential in supporting the knowledge economy, it is not considered very often as part of knowledge economy.

The notion that the care work is a type of work that does not require complex knowledge is not correct. It is simply that under the capitalist economy the type of knowledge that plays an important role in care work is not highly valued in monetary and moral terms. The ideology of knowledge economy distinguishes valuable knowledge that can be presented in the bits-and-bytes form from other types of knowledge and refuses to recognize the contribution of the latter. The so-called tacit knowledge, which is non-cognitive and embodied, plays an important role in the care-type work. Tacit knowledge cannot be converted into bits-and-bytes form in definition, and therefore, is not recognized as a component of knowledge economy.

In sum, a work that uses tacit knowledge does not fit into the theoretical framework of the labor concept which presumes the intentional control over a labor object by the mind. The post-Fordist regime of accumulation exerts double oppression to tacit knowledge. For the sake of smooth communication, tacit knowledge contributes substantially to the post-Fordist regime, but on the other hand, it is not recognized with justice as an element on which communicative labor is based. Furthermore, communication activities as labor generate formal and explicit knowledge in the bits-and-bytes form through the simulation of tacit knowledge, and by doing so the ideology of the post-Fordism deals with the newly generated formal knowledge as a functional alternative to tacit knowledge. Argument around emotional intelligence is a case in point. As a result, tacit knowledge is devalued due to this substituting process.

In the Fordist lifestyle, most of caring activities are undertaken by women as unpaid work in the family domain. However, the commodification of caring activities is pursued in the post-Fordist era. In Chapter 8 of the book, Nishikawa and Tanaka examines the case of elderly care workers, and in Chapter 9, Durbin analyzes the case of workers at UK call centers. They describe the peripheral and marginal area of the contemporary knowledge economy.

When we revisit these cases from a viewpoint of feminist economics, more attention should be paid to how the tacit knowledge used in the labor process is formed. Non-cognitive competence and tacit knowledge, which are associated with maintaining and promoting interpersonal relationships, are produced and accumulated naturally in the reproductive domain, and also that process is, of course, gendered.

For example, in the global cities, paid reproductive work tends to be undertaken by female migrant workers from Global South. Knowledge economy mobilizes them as a holder of nimble fingers
with sweet heart. Not only knowledge economy is gendered itself, but it utilizes gender relations with
global spatiality as well. Even if the male-female workers ratio of the ICT industry should be 50-50,
the nature of ICT per se is characterized by technological masculinity, and the reproduction process of
those workers engaged in the industry is strongly gendered. How these points would influence the
direction of future research is an important issue to be pursued.

I’m afraid that my presentation may not be listener-friendly, but I have already used up my
time limit. I’d like to conclude my presentation. Thank you all very much for your attention.

Mari Osawa
Thank you very much, Dr. Matsukawa. As far as Dr. Matsukawa’s comments were concerned, there
were two points that had referred to the book, and one had to do with nation state as the unit of analysis.
As far as feminist economics is concerned, they do wonder if this is appropriate unit or not. As far as
the gendering of financial domain, this is something that he has great expectations about. The original
version of this book was published in 2007. It was only after 2008 that the Lehman Brothers collapsed
and triggered the world economic crisis. Therefore as far as the originally included chapters of the book
are concerned, that reality has not been taken into account, but the newly written concluding chapter
by myself discusses financial crisis and natural disasters from a gender perspective. Here outside of
this hall, we display the books that have been written by the editors of this book. Sylvia Walby’s book
Crisis that published last year talks about the financial crisis and is not limited to that in terms of its
scope. The concluding chapter of the book refers to Walby’s Crisis.

Now we would like to take our break. Thank you very much for your kind attention.

[Break]
Knowledge, Capital Accumulation, and Gender:
A comment in a feminist economics perspective

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• Two main themes of the commentary
  • Theme 1
    • On basic traits of Feminist Economics (FE)
      • Idea of “Expanded Economy” approach
      • Importance to analyze the material basis of gender inequality and gender order
      • Attention to the hybridity of components of economy in terms of spatiality and functionality

• The objectives of this commentary
  • To approach the theoretical framework on which the articles of Gendering Knowledge Economy are based from a viewpoint of feminist economics.
  • To explore the theoretical strategy for the analysis of contemporary capitalistic economy in which “knowledge” plays a unique but critical role

• Theme 2
  • On the role of “knowledge” in capital accumulation and economy in the age of post-Fordism
    • Beyond discourse of “Knowledge-Based Society”
    • Gender-biased double transformation of knowledge production in production and reproduction domain
• Feminist critique to the orthodoxy of economics
  • (Gender-biased) theoretical concerns of the orthodoxy (both neo-classical and Marxist economics) with the commodified region of the economy
  • Feminist critiques on the basis of “Unpaid Work”
    • Domestic Labor Debate
    • Expanding the theoretical scope into non-marketized, reproductive domain of the economy
    • De-mythifying “Economic Man”

• “The Variety of Capitalism” results not only from the national variation of the regulation of employment relations (Walby, chap.1), but also from the (national) variation of the regulation of the reproductive domain.
  • Particularly, the gender-biased policy intervention to people’s “life-chance”

• Unpacking the reproductive domain of labor power (and life in itself)
  • Uncommodified “care” and its de-valorization
  • Gender-biased provisioning of care
  • Normalization of the modern family
    • Gender division of labor and male-breadwinner model
  • The post-WW II welfare state system as a resolution of “failure of the family”

• Spatial Dimension of Analysis in FE
  • Post-WW II Keynesian Welfare State provided stability for both productive and reproductive domain.
  • This resulted in the spatial integrity of a society, and the nation-state as the axiomatic (spatial) unit of analysis of a society
• FE gives a critical gaze to the nation as an unit of analysis.
  • Spatial hybridity of post-Fordist economy
  • International migration of productive capital and reproductive workers
  • Global city as a global-local nexus

• Emerging (gendered) financial domain
  • Relative autonomy of financial domain and its relations with reproductive domain
  • Gendering financial issues

• Discourse of “Knowledge Economy”
  • Knowledge (or information) as commodity
  • Knowledge as “a series of bits and bytes”: Infomationalization of knowledge
  • Control over the production of knowledge for capital accumulation

• Knowledge-based economy (KBE)
  • “Symbolic Analysts,” who are engaged with transformation of symbols, are a main player in KBE
  • Cognitive task occupies the central position of the capitalist division of labor in KBE
• Marginalization of care in capitalist economy
  • Hegemony of “labor” in the modern society
  • Labor is regarded as a process in which human mind substantializes itself in a physical form
  • Care is marginalized because it is beyond the scope of labor, but it is indispensable to the reproduction
  • Capitalist economy needs to allocate care to females in some normative and/or forcible manners

• Ideology of knowledge-based economy classifies knowledge into two kinds
  • Valuable kind of knowledge in the (possible) form of a series of bits vs. valueless kind of knowledge which is embodied and difficult to transform in a formal manner
  • Knowledge-based economy discourse devalues and excludes embodied tacit knowledge in its scope of analysis

• Double oppression against implicit knowledge in the post-Fordist regime
  • Communication is central in the labor process of post-Fordism
  • Tacit knowledge is critical in effective and efficient operations of communicative labor
  • However, the tacit knowledge is denied as a component of communicative “labor” and receive no reward

• Secondly, communicative labor produces mimic bits-formed knowledge of tacit knowledge, such as emotional intelligence
• Post-Fordist regime prompts the partial/incomplete transformation of care into paid work

• Articles in *Gendering Knowledge Economy* shed light on the issues associated with care labor, in which tacit knowledge plays a significant role, in the marginal fields of knowledge-based economy
  • Paid elderly care services (in Nishikawa & Tanaka, chap.8)
  • Call center operators (in Durbin, chap.9)

• Rather than bits-formed knowledge in knowledge-based economy, FE perspective suggests that more attention should be paid to the gendered (re)production process of tacit knowledge, particularly non-cognitive competence and embodied knowledge which is mobilized into post-Fordist capital accumulation.
Part II  How did the authors respond?

Mari Osawa

We would like to resume, if we may please. We have today all the coeditors of this book, Sylvia Walby, Heidi Gottfried, Karin Gottschall and me, and several authors here. In the second part, we would like to respond to the comments we’ve received in Part 1. And during several years that have passed since this book was first published in English, related research work and publications have been conducted by editors and authors, we would thus like to hear from the authors and editors about their recent work as well. In the comments that were given in Part 1, there were a lot of comments on the chapter written by Nishikawa and Tanaka. And I heard from Dr. Makiko Nishikawa that she has a question for clarification to Dr. Matsukawa. So, Makiko would you?

Makiko Nishikawa

I just want to ask a simple question to Prof. Matsukawa, if I may. You use the word, “Hi-Ninchi-Nouryoku (non-cognitive capabilities)”, but I do not quite understand it. I think it could be one of your key words, so could you explain what do you mean when you use it?

Seiichi Matsukawa

As far as non-cognitive abilities are concerned, this is something that’s talked about by people in the field of psychology. When we think about attitude and personality character, things of this sort, when one communicates there is a certain effect that is garnered and exhibited. Therefore, this is a type of ability and it’s considered as an ability. In terms of cognitive ability, we can understand this is one’s behavior and one’s character, but these cannot be turned into words. Therefore, it’s a certain skill or certain knowledge that one has. Therefore, I was talking about non-cognitive abilities from that perspective.
Makiko Nishikawa
I understand that “Ninchì (perception)” usually means how we give meaning to our environment. But based on what you’ve just said, I suppose you use it to distinguish between what is describable and indescribable. Is that how you separate the two, “Ninchì (cognitive)” and “Hi-Ninchì(non-cognitive)”?

Seiiichi Matsukawa
Yes.

Mari Osawa
Thank you very much for clarifying the point, and now we can go into the reply portion. I would like to invite the first editor, Sylvia Walby to talk in 15 minutes or so. Please Sylvia.

Sylvia Walby
First, let me thank Mari Osawa and the Institute of Social Science for such an impressive organization of an international event. It’s a pleasure to be here. The work that you have heard discussed is about the internationally relevant work on the gendering of the knowledge economy. It is internationally relevant even though there are variations between different parts of the world. Some of the questions which are being asked of us concern the significance of gender for the knowledge economy, and in particular, its significance for economic development, indeed for economic growth.

The argument in our book is that understanding the gendering of the knowledge economy is crucial if we are to understand the nature of economic growth and, in particular, for the nature of that economic growth, that is, growth that is also sustainable and inclusive and smart. The UN has new development goals which embed the concepts of sustainable and inclusive growth. It is not just any form of economic development. It is here that the significance of gender and knowledge are located, since they shape the kind of economic growth. In our book, we differentiated between the knowledge economy and the new economy. In some of the comments, these were conflated. We differentiate them so that we can think about the development of knowledge, embedded in education and skills, separately from thinking of the new economy. We identify the new forms of spatialities, contractualities, and temporalities which are associated with the deregulation of work. We analytically separate the issues concerned with knowledge and its associated concepts of human capital, education, skills (and also the debate on tacit knowledge) from the issues concerned with the restructuring of work resulting from the deregulation of work and its expression in new forms of contractualities, temporalities, and spatialities.

The distinction is important, especially in its gender dimensions, because, as we have been arguing, there are positive aspects of knowledge concerning its relationship to education and skills, while at the same time there are forms of deregulation that have generated forms of contractuality, spatiality, and temporality that have been destructive of the possibility of gender equality. While the development of knowledge has been very important in moves towards gender equality, the deregulation of the economy has not - we analytically distinguish between these changes in our arguments. Makiko contributed to further issues, including those concerning tacit knowledge. Karen Shire identified for
us the implications of different ways of measuring knowledge. Further, education and skills are matters for the state - the state has a significant role. Here perhaps we might take issue with what might be called the ‘traditional’ feminist economic position of thinking in terms of production and reproduction, whereas we as sociologists include a wider range of social institutions as relevant including the state and the significance of its public role and its provision of education, healthcare, care services, and indeed services to prevent violence against women - a variety of public functions of the states which are really important for gender relations.

We researched issues of regulation and deregulation. Heidi Gottfried in particular is going to discuss regulation and deregulation in relation to contractualities, spacialities, and temporalities. Karin Gottschall will address issues concerning the role of states in mediating the intricacies of the intersection of class and gender. I will now address some of the big theoretical questions in the book.

We discuss varieties of capitalism and varieties of gender regimes. Gender changes are not merely due to capitalism. We conceptualise gender as a system, which has more important theoretical implications than simply showing that gender matters for capitalism. Gender is a system in its own right. Gender as a system changes capitalism as a system; as well as capitalism as a system changing gender as a system. Our book is about the mutual adaptation of capitalist and gender regimes, not merely the way that gender is included in the structuring of capitalist relations. A specific example of the implications of our theory is that we don’t suggest that the family has failed. Rather we argue that the family has been restructured. It is not a failure for care work to be performed by the state; it is progress, not failure. When we see the socialization of domestic labor as a consequence of feminist interventions which have pushed for the developments of the public dimension of the state, this is progress; not the failure of the family.

The book discusses changes in the gender regime and changes in capitalism. The specific focus of analysis is on the new forms of the economy both in terms of knowledge and in terms of the restructuring of the conditions of employment. Those forms of regulation are complex. It is not just that the transformations are about the rebalancing of production and reproduction, but that the regulation of gendered labor within the field of production is itself being restructured as a consequence of state interventions. What is the state? Sometimes the state is understood as the state in one country. But several of the contributors in this book come from the European Union, which has a very complex polity, with multiple levels of the state. The EU-level is very significant in the regulation of employment, particularly for the equal treatment of women and men in employment, for equal pay, equal pay for work of equal value, equal entitlements to part-time workers; while the Member State-level has authority over issues of welfare.

For some issues there is transnational EU level regulation and for other issues Member State-level regulation. Further, there are complex global processes. Capital is global, especially finance capital. Companies which operate in more than one country will have forms of regulation derived from more than one country - Glenda is our expert contributor on this issue, providing an example of the ways in which global pressures come to bear.

Mari has invited me to also say something about our later work. This has addressed the significance of the financial crisis. My own work has engaged with the crisis. The crisis started with the deregulation of finance. It has been cascading into the real economy, then cascading into the fiscal - fiscal pressures leading to in some countries austerity - cascading further into political pressures and
cascading in some locations into violence and constitutional chaos.

In Europe and North America in 2008, many found the crisis to be extraordinary. Perhaps we should have learned from the experiences in Japan around 1990. The financial crisis that Japan experienced around 1990 was widely regarded, at that time in Western analysis, as exceptional. That was a mistake. Financial crises are common to all these countries, and we should have learnt from each other through our international exchanges, rather than interpreting these issues as particular to certain countries. Our colleagues in the Global South have also experienced financial crises, and suggest that what the West calls austerity is what was previously called structural adjustment. We should learn from the South as well. These are transnational-international issues on which scholars should all learn from each other.

This event is a unique opportunity for us to learn from each other and to learn how the specificities of the gendering of the institutions in each of these countries have shared patterns as well as differences; and their implications for the achievement of sustainable economic developments that is inclusive and produces gender equality for all of us everywhere. Thank you.

Mari Osawa
Thank you very much. While the second editor, Heidi Gottfried does not contribute a specific chapter to the book, she has excellently organized several workshops and conference panels of our network GLOW, carefully read all the manuscripts and given comments to make coherence between the chapters stronger. Therefore I would like to invite Heidi to respond and talk later from that point of view. Then, let me invite the third editor Karin Gottschall to respond and give comments from the point of view of being an editor, and an author of chapter 6.

Karin Gottschall
Thank you very much. I would like to second Sylvia in thanking Mari Osawa and the other co-organizers of this event that we have the chance to re-discuss the issues we raised with this volume which was born out of quite a couple of years of intense discussions and empirical work. There perhaps two aspects I would like to address. The first one is the issue of chances and risks which are embodied in the new dynamics of the economy which we address with regard to the knowledge economy with a broad perspective on what is meant by knowledge economy. I would like to address the issue of intersections of class and gender because this also speaks to the questions of chances or advantages on the one hand and risks on the other. In the end, I would also like to address a more methodological question which had been raised by Professor Matsukawa where taking countries as a unit of analysis is still a valid way to address questions of dynamics of labor markets in the times of globalization.

But first addressing chances and risks of knowledge economy in the broad sense we defined it. I think we all agreed in our empirical work that looking at new dynamics of labor markets in a changing economy brings about insights also on new forms of risks, new social risks. If I take the example of self-employment as a new form of employment, it might be a good case in point here although it so far only covers a small proportion of overall employment, but nevertheless it spreads across all the economy. Women are heavily involved in these forms of employment and it is an increasing employment
form, a type of employment across OECD countries including Japan. What we see in self-employment and what is significant and I would quote on you is that we have a combination of a workforce with high educational levels that is a well-trained workforce on the one hand, but on the other hand, often this is accompanied by low income which can be raised in the market and security in terms of continuity of income.

What does it mean? In terms of social risks, it means that it is difficult for this workforce and especially difficult for women to use the income in order to care for old age, for example, and in some countries even for health insurance. There is a specific combination of qualification and low income, and we see deficits in social security or livelihood systems because these systems when we have these systems and in most OECD countries there is some kind of welfare state, these systems usually are modeled upon the standard employment relationship meaning upon a traditional type of wage work. So social security risk or social risk of these workers are not well carried for and what they do and Professor Hagiwara 01:40:32 already pointed out to this, if they have on an individual level, they try to take care of these risks and often it is the household and the family, these workers fall back on and this of course affects women in a different way than it does men.

With regard to intersections of gender and class, what we see is that looking all over the labor market and the employment regimes we have there, that women have caught up in education but the higher education and higher labor market integration of women or higher employment rates not transform and transfer necessarily in better labor market positions rather we find new segmentations in labor markets and often we find women in relation to men in minor positions, although they have caught up with education. So, the standard argument of meritocracy solving inequality problems seems to not easily apply to women. We also find more heterogeneity among women and that’s where the class issue comes in. We have in many OECD countries, including Germany, with the flexibilization of labor markets and you know this from Japan too.

We have a higher proportion of women who are confronted with precarious work, risk of unemployment, low-wage work, curtailed working hours or long working hours not compensated for, and lack of social security provision. Whereas on the other hand, we also have women who are making slowly inroads in higher positions, managerial positions for example. So, there are questions to be addressed with regard to women’s labor market position and gender inequality in the labor market in an expanding and highly dynamic knowledge economy. And they need to be addressed, not only by collective actors, such as unions and occupational organizations, but also by the state who is regulating the market. As Sylvia already mentioned, we see the state as a central actor in welfare capitalism, as it’s regulating employment forms and as it’s also responsible for social security system.

In this respect, the state is crucial and re-regulating new types of employments also are crucial with regard to gender equality. And if you also take into account that in most OECD countries, the state is among the most important employers, especially regarding female employment, public female employment rights usually are higher than in corporate industry or tend to be higher. So, we see that there is a double or even triple role where the state comes in, not only with regard to social security systems and the regulation of the labor market, for example, minimum-wage regulation but also as an employer, and the state has the power to be a model employer with regard to private business. But what we see in the two past decades is rather that due to pressure on public budget that the state is containing employment or curtailing employment, and also we see a flexibilization of work in the
public sector. But there is leeway of course for political action in this respect.

Finally, the methodological issue I wanted to respond to. I think our book or the work we did in some respect stands out as we try to cover a broad spectrum of countries and it’s not only the EU world, and it’s also not only the Western world in the sense of the EU and the US but we included Japan. In Japan, this was really crucial for our analysis, we learned a lot from this because with this broad sample of countries we had a variety, not only of capitalism but also of social security systems and gender regimes. And one reason for pertaining, for really drawing on country comparisons in order to analyze changes in employment and changes in gender regimes was, and still is of course, that the data available is available on a nation-state level. So, this spatiality really is crucial here and also the political regulations of work and social policy still are based on a nation-state level.

Heidi Gottfried

Okay. I’d like to echo Sylvia and Karin thanking Mari Osawa for bringing the core group’s authors together to discuss this international project, and since we are talking about the knowledge economy, I want to just reflect on the sort of mode of knowledge production that we as a group are engaged in which I think several people alluded to, that this book would not have been possible without a sustained conversation, without country experts and those who could and have been engaged in comparative research.

The book, as we know, was written nearly 10 years ago and so much has changed and many of us have written books to discuss some of the comments about those changes, particularly around crisis, financialization, and also about new spatialities, re-assemblages with regard to global cities, global cities within nations, relationships within regions. We often talked about here in East Asia, new configurations, also in Asia. But I want to focus on two main issues that are our themes within the book, what is knowledge and what our book does is redefine and re-conceptualize what we mean by knowledge, what constitutes knowledge. Much of the literature on this sort of knowledge-based discourse focused on a particular set of occupations and sectors, and Karen’s chapter shows quite nicely that in fact it encompasses reproductive labor and increasingly commodified reproductive labor. The knowledge-intensive services is where we see the concentration of feminized work and also reproductive labor, whether it’s based and delivered by the nation-state or through families.

We also looked at what is being produced, the inference was that there’s a new quality of labor, the labor product. That was the debate that you had before we made our comments, what is non-cognitive labor, but feminists redefined what we mean by skill, what we mean by knowledge. So, it’s not only the bits and bytes, which is what a lot of the theories of the knowledge economy focused on, which is a set of occupations, but it also has to do with the enhancing of capabilities and also the interactive service work that improves well-being. It is also affective labor; and that this is labor that women have been engaged in unpaid capacities but increasingly in paid capacities, and that it’s been unacknowledged and it involves emotional labor. It’s unacknowledged and devalued because it’s not considered labor. Makiko will talk about tacit knowledge as important to make visible because many of the occupations, particularly care work which is a very important and a growing sector around the world, that is one of the areas to make possible social reproduction in this new crisis period. The tacit knowledge by making it visible, we can revalue what knowledge is as well. Finally, in terms of
what is knowledge, it’s redefining what is skill, what is the basis of skill, and how it already embeds certain gendered understandings of skill.

The second point that I want to make is with regard to the changing nature of work, and this is where we identified three key dimensions; spatialities, temporalities and contractualities. In terms of spatialities, we did talk about transnational forces as they play out within international space and we’ve talked about why we chose the nation. Spatialities means more than that. Spatialities also have to do with the restructuring of work so that work no longer takes place in a particular enterprise or company, the sites of where work takes place is being de-anchored to particular capital and capitalists. The sites are moving. I think you mentioned the blurring of the distinction between productive and reproductive, that more work is taking place from the home and in the home, so you have increasing paid labor force that is both supplementing as well as replacing unpaid labor. So, the spatialities are changing with certain consequences. We know that in the Fordist era, it was a collective enterprise and unions were based on the collective worker. Now when you have this atomization with more workers, particularly women workers, in the home and working from the home, you have this individualization, you have further alienation and the problems of social exclusion and the problems of organizing.

Secondly, we talked about the shifting and changing temporalities again it’s based on the old Fordist model. Post-Fordism is a model in which hours work and schedules can range from the British, this is one of my favorite examples, zero-hour contracts and it took me years to figure out what that meant because it’s a formal contract with an employer with no guarantees of even a single-hour of work. You have also a whole continuum and range of new working schedules, such as on-call work and also as-needed work, part-time, temporary work. These are all types of schedules where, that’s insecure, unpredictable, and in terms of livelihood security, you have no way of knowing what your actual income will be and there is no commitment. This is the old bargain that is eroding, unraveling, a bargain that women were included in different ways, but this old bargain is unsustainable and there’s a crisis in the old bargain.

And then finally, contractualities – we’ve talked about self-employment that you have now a whole set of or diversification of employment relationships that refer to different kinds of rights and expectations and the lack of any commitment to some workers. That with new forms of employment you have increasing insecurity and precarity as well as Karen talked about new social risks that are associated, and that they are born differently by different groups of women and between men and women, so it’s gendered in particular ways.

Also, I want to just make one sort of side comment, which is I think Makiko will also discuss in her chapter or she has discussed, is the kind of tension between on the one hand, increasing professionalization and regularization on the one hand and this is true in care work, and the flexiblization, informalization on the other hand. So you have a small group of workers who do have an opportunity now for their skills to be recognized.

So just to recap, I think that what we did is anticipated many of the trends that we see today in the transformation of the economy, that we provided new frameworks, new categories, new concepts to think about how work is gendered, how it’s been transformed.

**Mari Osawa**

Thank you very much. Well, then to the authors. We would like to have them provide their replies as
well as their comments. First, Karen Shire, the author of chapter 2; and then Ilse Lenz, chapter 4; Glenda Roberts, chapter 5; and Makiko Nishikawa, chapter 8. Today, we are not able to have Kazuko Tanaka. So Makiko, if you could please speak a little longer for your coauthor as well.

**Karen Shire**

Because the editors have covered many of the topics that have been raised, I think I would just like to make two points about the book, and I thank the commentators for focusing on some of these issues in a very productive way. The first point is that I think one of our main aims was to deconstruct what is the knowledge economy. In our discussions we shifted from talking about the knowledge economy to talking about the knowledge-intensive and information-intensive economy. We were making use of the European Union definition of knowledge-intensive services to break away from the view of mainstream political economy, which narrowly focuses on how the industrial economy is changing from productive labor to high-tech and science-based industries. Of course, that’s part of it.

But as soon as we look at the employment effects of broader changes in economic activities we see that neither of the ways in which the United Nations or the OECD was defining the knowledge economy covers more than 5% of workers and that in neither of these sectors are women in any way distributed throughout the occupational structure, that is, they are concentrated in very few occupations towards the lower end of skills and wages. But, and this is going to overlap with Makiko’s contributions, as soon as we take into account that knowledge is not just so-called explicit knowledge but also tacit knowledge and that knowledge in places like the health sector or the education sector is also explicit and not just tacit, we break the myth that the knowledge economy is only high-tech, and include activities like social services, education and health services part of the knowledge economy. These sectors are also extremely knowledge-intensive. Work in these sectors is not just about emotional labor because it’s also constituted through hard scientific facts, formalized and explicit knowledge.

I think you all want to think that if you go to a medical doctor for a serious illness, or when you are cared for by nurses, that what health professionals do is very knowledge intensive, not just in terms of emotional labor but also in terms of knowing medical knowledge and being able to treat people properly, and it’s not correct to misrecognize the knowledge- and information intensivity of these sectors in depictions of the knowledge economy. As soon as we take this broad view of the knowledge economy, not just being the financial sector and not just being ICT, and not just being content information but also being social services, education and health services, we have a much more accurate picture of how our economy is changing overall, and the role of men, the role of women, the role of knowledge in these changes, and that’s what we were trying to argue for.

My second point: I very much appreciated Hagiwara’s comments asking how can we think about inequalities, how can we think about positive movements within changing the knowledge economy, and I think that’s what we were trying to get at by showing the lines of inequality, by looking at occupational differences, by looking at employment contract differences. And there we see very, very clearly that occupational formations are still happening in a very gender segregated way, and that there is a systematic way in which the occupations that women are dominant in are not being
developed in a way that’s even useful for providing the best social services and the best health care, and that that’s a problem not just for gender equality, but also a problem for sustainable services, care, welfare and education.

And the second point which really comes out I think in Nishikawa-san’s chapter is what happens when knowledge workers in the form of care workers, in the form of elderly care workers are put into non-regular contracts. When knowledge-intensive workers are employed irregularly, especially the tacit knowledge that should be applied in those work situations is not available because the workers are changing from one shift to the other. They don’t leave any documentation behind and that affects the quality of services that we are all depending upon increasingly as our societies age.

Mari Osawa
Thank you very much. Please Dr. Lenz.

Ilse Lenz

Let me join in sincere thanks to Dr. Osawa for making this symposium possible. I would like to answer to some questions and comments. My chapter was on global governance, on gender equality and the way it has been localized in different gender regimes. So what happened since then? On the one hand, there have been regulations for gender equality. But while they somewhat referred to global and national equality norms, they were mostly promoted by the idea of demographic decline. So they relied on economic and national arguments about demographic development. In this context we have to look very carefully at the class and ethnic aims of these state strategies: In Germany, these policies and regulations like the paid parents’ childcare period have a middle-class and upper-class bias. So women and men who are in management will have childcare leave for 65% of the wage and thus this program rather promotes middle-class and upper-class women to combine employment and having children. Therefore evaluating these strategies, we have to look at gender, class and migration.

Also the national and right populist parties and movements are aiming to abolish global and national regulation for gender equality generally. They argue with various neoliberal, nationalist or gender fundamentalist frames, indeed protesting or blocking new regulations and demanding a complete rollback of gender policies. According to them, national mothers should stay at home and the state should not intervene at all in gender or family inequality. Actually, now feminist and emancipatory groups are looking for strategies to cope with these right populist forces (cf. http://library.fes.de/pdf-files/bueros/budapest/11382.pdf for Europe).

Dr. Hagiwara’s point about organizations in the knowledge economy is very important: A lot of informal networking can be observed in sectors included in this new concept of knowledge economy, as well as in the more classical data processing etc. I am sorry I don’t have a comparative overview. I can only refer to the German case. The service workers’ union Verdi [ph 02:04:48] now is the strongest union in Germany and it’s organizing service workers in the public and private sector as bank workers, nurses or carers for the elderly. So, in this kind of service and knowledge sector, organization has proceeded in informal and formal ways. But the level and strength of international organization is low and there is very little research except on some industries as domestic workers.
If one talks about international strong trade union networks, one still thinks about the metal workers. But the informal and formal organization processes forms in diverse sectors of knowledge work definitely are a very a very interesting development and challenge for research.

Dr. Hagiwara and Dr. Gottschall also raised the point about intersectional inequalities of gender, migration and class. What does the increased skill formation in the diverse sectors of the knowledge economy mean especially if we look at it in an intersectional way? For this, please allow me to go very shortly into my present research. I have been analyzing the changing access to education and diverse occupations by gender and migration by looking at the German microcensus from 1990 – 2011. The microcensus is the largest existing databank and it provides information on gender as well as on the diverse migration background of different groups. Persons with migration background formed 21 % of the population in 2015. They encompass persons with German passport who have some migration background (share of 11,5%) as they immigrated themselves or have one migrant parent and persons with non-German nationality (share of 9.5 %) (http://www.bpb.de/wissen/NY3SWU,0,0,Bevölkerung_mit_Migrationshintergrund_1.html).

Educational inequality by gender has decreased dramatically. Presently men and women have equal shares of high school and university degrees. But they still study different fields like humanities for women and engineering for men.

However, educational inequality by migration has been decreasing, but is still is strong. 20 years ago, migrants could hardly go to high school, but now the rate of high school diplomas [ph 02:06:30] has doubled in all groups. The share has increased much faster for German children with migration background. In 2010, Polish girls had the highest share of high school diplomas with about 50% whereas the German average was 42 % (46 % among girls). Especially among children with Turkish nationality, more than one half did not proceed beyond elementary education (main school or drop out). These results indicate that the migration status of German or other nationality is an important factor in shaping inequalities in education as it influences the level of security for developing one’s personal educational and work careers. Region of origin and the security of stay connected with the German passport and the exclusion and insecurity connected with the foreign passport are both relevant whereas the importance of gender is receding.

Did the increasing level of education impact on access to knowledge intensive occupations? I analyzed the German microcensus according to the three-digit ISCO classifications in which give information on specific occupations like managers, engineers or nurses. Gender discrimination, especially horizontal discrimination remains strong, whereas the ethnic discrimination of men with German passports is receding. For example, autochthonous and Turkish-origin German men have the same share in management with 7% of the whole group. Academic professions form an exception: Here the importance of migration status is strong, as the access of Germans with migration background is higher than that of migrants with foreign passports. But gender impact inside of each group seems to be receding. However, skilled crafts and trades and industrial professions are nearly exclusively male and there is a female majority in personal and social service in all groups. Women with Russian and Turkish passports are strongly segmented into unskilled work with a share of 30-33%. This means that about one-third of women with Russian and Turkish passports have no perspective beyond simple or assistant work. The respective share of German men is 7.3 % and of German women is 8.3 %. This points to a marked intersectional segmentation by gender and migration.
Still, increases in academic jobs for migrant men mostly but also a little bit for migrant women can be observed as well as increases for migrant women in so-called technical and nurses, non-academic jobs. We can surmise that intersectional closure of these jobs by migration and gender is opening up with increased educational participation and that inequality is receding but also turning more complex. Intersectional inequalities are on the move and we have to look at how this relates flexibilization and casualisation. The flexibilization of gender and migration strongly interacts with flexible global and national capitals in very complicated dynamics. To come back to the start of my statement, regulations for gender equality and capitalist flexibilization may concur and overlap. Maybe transitions to a new flexible gender order are taking place.

Glenda Roberts

Thank you, Mari, for organizing this. It’s wonderful to be back together with everyone in the same room, or almost everyone, and to be thinking about these issues again. My chapter in this book has to do with the question of how corporations try to implement gender equality in the workplace from quite a long time ago. And I started by looking at a multinational financial services firm which was from the United States here in Japan. I was interested to see if they were very progressive in promoting women and training women, and in keeping female employees. So, I started out by looking at them and I did the research in 1999 or so on the American multinational. This was at a time when they had already established flexible work arrangements and tried to push promotions for women in the United States from 10 or 15 years previous to that, from about the mid-1980s.

I wondered whether that corporation was implementing the same sorts of policies in their corporation in Japan, and as it turned out, what I was told was that there was a 10-year lag. They didn’t start at the same time and they said it was a top-down decision. A major manager came from the United States to Japan in the very late 80s or 1990, and he looked at the board room and he said, “Where are all the women? I don’t see any women here,” and he apparently pushed that corporation to start figuring out where women were and what they could do to foster their employment. So by the time I was actually talking to women at that company in 1999-2000, there were many women vice presidents and women were taking advantage of so-called flexible policies like coming to work a bit late in the morning or taking childcare time, or sometimes doing project-based work when after they came back from having a child so that they wouldn’t be constrained by the some of the hours they were ordinarily constrained by. There were many different things they were trying to take advantage of.

At that firm, there were many, many policies in place, but there were also many problems, one being that the pace was very intense. So women recognized if they wanted to be promoted, they had to work their heads off. Furthermore, the hours were very long and it was really stressful. But they would be promoted and they would be rewarded. So that was kind of bargain they made. If they decided to stay there, they knew they were going to come up against these kinds of issues but many women did it. Some didn’t like it, so some would quit but some did it. But the notion was gender equality equals working like the male executive in this financial services firm, with a few permutations for women who recently had a child or something like that. But basically, if you took too much “advantage” of flexibility, you would not go far very fast. Then I thought, I really want to look at a Japanese firm,
what is it like in a major Japanese firm, and so I studied a manufacturer that also had a research arm and factories, but I only studied white-collar women, highly educated women.

This firm told me, “Oh, we want our highly educated women to stay on and actually they do stay on, but they’ll get promoted someday. It’s a slow pace here, but we want to let them have their time for family and so forth.” And the women also told me that that was the way it was, so nobody was being promoted very quickly, no one was being particularly rewarded for her efforts but (at least) they were staying on as regular employees. I have been following those women since 2003. I am still following them. The company has changed in this ensuing period. Today we’ve been talking about changes in the economy, right? The company has changed. The company is flatter now, seniority is not so important. What does that mean? It means young women have the advantage in being promoted and being recognized, and women who thought they were going to be promoted in their 40s and who therefore took advantage of flexibility are being sidelined, and that’s really interesting to me. In a way, they see it as perhaps fair enough because they did take advantage of quite a few flexible policies such as going on transfer with their spouse for 3 years to a foreign country and then coming back and resuming their position. However, some of them still really want to be competitive in this company and wish they could be promoted but it looks like that’s not going to happen. There was a downside for them in making use of flexible work arrangements, one that they had not foreseen. In other words, they have been sandwiched between the earlier model of “let them take it slowly and enjoy their childrearing years” and the new more neo-liberal trend towards rewarding achievement earlier and encouraging a swifter pace, regardless of age.

I know our book is much more theoretical and my chapter in the book is more case study oriented, but from the vantage of these case studies, one can say that one thing that holds everyone back from gender equality here in Japan is the hugely long hours of work which causes depression in employees, it causes suicides, it is bad for men and it is bad for women alike. Nobody can take advantage of flexible policies in that environment and not be punished for it. I think when we talk about regulation, work hours have to be seriously regulated. If work hours lessen, there is much more potential to see men taking on their share of domestic work. I see men nowadays carrying their infants in front-packs. I see them out in the park, Saturday and Sunday. I see them taking their children to daycare in the morning. They can’t do it in the evening. They can’t pick up because they have to be there until midnight. I think there will be much more gender equality for men and women if hours at work can be curtailed greatly and if people are given their vacation time fully. And I’ll stop there because I probably took longer than 5 minutes. Thank you.

Makiko Nishikawa

Many people have requested that I should speak about tacit knowledge, so I would like to talk about two points about it. First, Prof. Hagiwara and Prof. Matsukawa, thank you very much for your comments. Having heard your comments on tacit knowledge, however, I am concerned that my intention might not have been properly understood. So, first, I would like to talk about that, if I may. And another point, I would like to focus on care work particularly, and talk about the way how we learn to care, or how we acquire the knowledge and skills of care.

First point. I had a feeling that the commentators were talking about tacit
knowledge on the assumption that it does not necessarily generate economic value. But actually, the concepts of tacit knowledge and explicit knowledge have been used by management specialists. In the field of organizational management, they suggest that tacit knowledge has huge potential for creating economic value, and discuss how to transfer the embedded, tacit knowledge into explicit knowledge.

However, in order to generate economic value out of tacit knowledge, a great amount of effort should be made. And that effort should be collective. Tacit knowledge has the nature that it can be shared only by face-to-face interaction. Therefore, without the collective effort, tacit knowledge can hardly be turned into economic value. In addition, as far as “value” is concerned, it is not just “economic” value but also “social” value that we should look at. It can be said that tacit knowledge which is transferred by face-to-face interaction has always generated great value in our society, but the value is “social” rather than “economic.”

To sum up, it takes a great amount of collective effort for tacit knowledge to be externalized and turned into economic value, but it has always generated social value throughout our history. As far as economic value and social value and their relations are concerned, however, social value has not been directly transferred to economic value, and these two have not been regarded of equal value. The two commentators also suggested this point, I do believe. This inequality, again, is relevant to the difficulty of generating economic value out of tacit knowledge. Transferring tacit knowledge into explicit knowledge is hard to do.

So far, my explanation is rather broad and made at the societal level, but what can we say at the individual level? From now on, I won’t talk about tacit knowledge in general, but in terms of care work. For care work too, the economic value has not been acknowledged fully, or care work has not necessarily generated economic value. That was mentioned by both of the commentators at the very onset. Care work can be either unpaid or paid, but this point can be applied to both paid and unpaid care. Though care work does not necessarily generate economic value, or its economic value has not been acknowledged fully, it has always generated social value.

Then, what social value care work has generated at the individual level? Of course, the well-being of those who receive care will be enhanced. In family, it would be the well-being of the child or the parent. On the other hand, although we tend to focus on the care recipient, for the care provider, too, the gratitude from the care recipient can be of social value. Thus, at the individual level as well, care work is hard to be tied to economic value, but as far as social value is concerned, care work has always generated great value in our society. That is my first point. There exist economic value and social value, and these are not the same.

My second point is how we learn to care that has generated such social value. If I did not misunderstand Prof. Matsukawa’s comments, he suggested as if how to care was learnt naturally. But care work has not been learnt naturally. In providing care, as I suggested before, tacit knowledge is very important. We come to learn how to care by sharing care experiences face-to-face. For this type of learning, from the point of view of gender, being a female gives an advantage. Our society has been expecting women to take the role of a care provider, so that women have found themselves in the position to be encouraged such learning.

When we think of the traditional learning environment, we have learnt how to care in the extended family and in the community where many care dialogs and care transactions have been taken place. But such learning environment has been diminishing as more women are now in employment
and less care dialogs and transactions are taken place in family and in community. In this changing environment, how can we maintain and enhance the knowledge and skills of care? I think the role of paid care work will become more and more important.

In paid care work, tacit knowledge should not be left as it is. It should be externalized, to be made systematic and professional. Through these processes each care provider will be able to learn further. Then the quality of care will be also improved. However, such learning environment has been diminishing in the private sphere such as in family and in community, and therefore, we should encourage collective learning in the public sphere, in the care service sector.

But as far as the current Japanese situation is concerned, main focus is not on the development of such learning environment, but on the replacement of decreasing private, unpaid family care with increasing public, paid care quantitatively. Therefore, we should recognize that care work is based on tacit knowledge. I think the processes of externalizing tacit knowledge into explicit knowledge and systematizing the knowledge and skills of care should be further encouraged. Thank you for your attention.

Mari Osawa

Thank you very much. Though we are running out of time, but I would just like to say one word regarding the point that Dr. Matsukawa raised, namely the nation state as the unit of analysis needs to be somehow relativized. I think his point is quite valid, and analyses in chapters on EU member countries of this book naturally take into account something that transcends the nation-state, or as Sylvia said, multilevel governance. Perhaps the analysis of my chapter, chapter 3, is most limited to nation-state level. Since Japan is not under any supranational governance like EU, and it takes its own actions as a country, even though it nearly always say yes to what the United States tells us. But I admit that the unit of analysis has to be reconsidered.

However, if I may go back to the issue of financial and economic crisis after the collapse of the Lehman Brothers, the problem or the root cause was almost simultaneously switched to budget deficits of various countries, rather than excessive deregulation of financial markets. This is quite clearly discussed and analyzed in Sylvia’s book Crisis. And when fiscal deficits in Greece, Italy and Spain triggered the euro crisis, there was not much that EU itself could do. This has, I think, in turn revealed the importance of sovereign state, and importance of nation-state as a unit of analysis. Now after Brexit what will happen? I am sure that this is a matter that you are all very interested in. So perhaps if we can talk about that in our conclusion, we’d really appreciate it.

Well in this venue, experts of gender analysis of care and finance, and gender analysis in the context of natural disasters, those are the areas where we have many experts joining today. So in the general discussion and summary, not just asking questions but I hope you will share with us your insightful inputs.

[ Break]
Part III   General discussion and Summary

Mari Osawa

We would like to begin the final part. Professor Hagiwara and Professor Matsukawa, you have listened to the replies from the editors and authors. So if you have anything that you would like to re-reply, please do so in a brief manner. After that, we would like to open the discussion to the floor so that we could also learn from the participants today and I would like to encourage participants to talk about their research work relevant to the content of this book.

Seiichi Matsukawa

Thank you very much for your comments and replies. There are quite a few points that I could talk about, but I would like to make two points. This was something that I have been thinking myself and still haven’t really figured out, so the spatial unit for analysis and about spatiality and also intersectionality. The importance of those is emphasized by almost everyone; however, intersectionality, spatiality and temporality, if we think about the relationships of those and how specific research and what kind of research directions that we should apply to understand the relationship of those, so that is something that I am not sure about. For example, take in certain industry and then look into the employees to understand its gender and also ethnicity, we could tell that changes are happening but that shouldn’t be all. So what kind of approaches that we can take to be productive? So that does not really replay [ph 02:31:22] to the replies that I received but something, this is a point I wanted to make.

And another thing is about knowledge, especially the tacit knowledge, so when it comes to knowledge, how it is produced and it is produced in what way and considered and how it was used, and maybe those are the questions that we should explore. So that was the intention of my report because I said it’s because the tacit knowledge in the productive domain of women, you know that tacit knowledge is naturalized. Therefore, it is free of charge. However, the knowledge produced in that domain, how it is treated is one of the points that I would like to understand. The producers of such knowledge, how can they be developed as actors of such knowledge is another point.

Kumiko Hagiwara

I am very grateful for the comments by the authors. With regard to the analysis of intersectionality, as far as I have read through this book, I found the authors adopted the perspective effectively in their analysis. For example, as seen in the chapter by Professor Perrons, the research framework was set up to understand the intersectionality of gender and class in the area of the so-called UK Silicon Valley, focusing on the local employment structure and organization of work, which consists of knowledge workers in the new media industry at the high end and the childcare workers at the low end. The research and analytical framework also showed the changes in the intersectionality of the new economy and traditional care work within the whole UK economy.

Likewise, in the analysis of self-employment and freelancers, with particular focus on risk
management, the authors clearly show the relations of gender and the nation. Looking at the practices at the intersection of micro-level personal risk management and social security at the national level, based on industrial society, the authors show clearly that gender is an integral part of the newly emerging stratification of the employment structure. I was very much inspired by the analytical point of view and the frameworks of these case studies.

At the same time, I assume locality and the local labor market would be important elements for capturing social change and gender in the new economy. The local labor market is not excluded from the knowledge economy. To understand the gender dynamics of the new economy regarding work and employment, as in the Global City by Sassen, which focused on the supra-national circuit of economy and growing disparities via production of services including ICT, it is meaningful to look at the internal linkage between local labor markets in the nation-state and those national and supra-national changes.

Another point regards gender equality and the knowledge economy, which was mentioned in the earlier comments. I would like to clarify my argument and questions. Knowledge management has emerged as the important issue for organizational management, especially since the 90s. However, beyond knowledge management as the human relational approach from the standpoint of human resource management, or as the organizational management for creating innovation, technologies in knowledge production are deeply embedded in the labor process, and the management can mobilize the technology to suit their objectives. Once the management finds it profitable or necessary for their business, they take in whatever particular tacit knowledge, or the knowledge acquired personally and privately, which have been regarded as invaluable. In such processes of conversion from tacit knowledge to explicit and collective knowledge, greedy capitalism would modify and alter the tacit knowledge acquired personally in a way that fulfills business demand for profit, innovation, or whatever, for their business. I am terrified by the fact that the knowledge acquired in personally lived experience or in personal relationships with others is easily converted and distorted, via technology, into the collective and explicit knowledge to satisfy business purposes. Our tacit knowledge is always exposed to such demands now.

Therefore, I totally agree that tacit knowledge has economic value. For that very reason, I argue that we should question how such knowledge is converted into the knowledge to meet the demands of the existing capitalist economy. If we look over these processes, can we really go deeper into the gendered structure and disparities that knowledge economy is (re)producing? How can we change or retrieve the process for ourselves? Who are the counter-actors for that? How can we form and develop agencies? Those were the points of my question. I rest my case. Thank you.

Mari Osawa
It seemed that there would be a debate between the two commentators. With regard to the analysis of intersectionality, Dr. Matsukawa was saying that it was not very clear how to analyze it and I would take that comment as a valid comment, and now we would like to open the floor for questions or any comment from the participants.

It’s a very good opportunity for everyone, especially that we have today Japan’s leading researcher of feminism and gender, Dr. Chizuko Ueno here, but she is busy in video recording this event. Do you have anything to say, Dr. Ueno?
Chizuko Ueno

Thank you very much for asking my opinion, and thank you very much for inspiring discussion. I was to just video record, but I have some questions and comment; 20-30 years ago, the feminists were optimistic about the new economy and I still remember that. So, when the information capitalism makes progress, they believed in the “happy marriage between capitalism and feminism” where it would eventually break down the gender barrier. However, as a result of the analysis, it seems that optimism ended in pessimism. This is my first question.

In addition, the knowledge economy has brought out opportunities for women, which ended up with the disparity between women. However, those who succeeded, as Dr. Matsukawa pointed out, must be the ones who nicely fit in the technical masculinity required by knowledge economy. Accordingly, this disparity between women undermines the solidarity of women based on the collective identity of women, and as a result it made feminism more difficult. So those are the two questions I have.

To Nishikawa-san, I also conduct research in care work in the gender perspective. Therefore, I totally agree with you that care is knowledge-intensive work, which requires professionalization. That tacit knowledge in care work should be externalized and changed into explicit knowledge, I also agree. However, even if this could be achieved, the care work will still remain not very highly valued and deemed at the bottom of the ladder in the labor market. As I can not get rid of these suspicions, I wish you could please comment on that as well. Thank you.

Mari Osawa

Are there any other questions or comments? We would like to respond after a few questions and comments at the least. Please do not hesitate. We do have this wonderful opportunity, please seize the opportunity.

Mariko Adachi

I have. Mariko Adachi is my name from Ochanomizu University and I study Feminist Economics and have been researching in that field in Japan for many years. My understandings might be slightly different from what Dr. Matsukawa had said, but if I may please speak from my point of view, I would truly appreciate the opportunity. As far as the 2007 book is concerned, this book was then translated into Japanese and I do recall the discussion that was held at that time, as Dr. Ueno had said.

As far as the new economy is concerned during the 1990s, it was something that has positive aspects. And during the 90s in the United States, the mainstream economists, from their point of view, argued that though new economy might have some kind of cyclical fluctuation but no crisis would emerge and the future was thought to be very bright.

But when we think about the knowledge economy or the new economy from a gender perspective, unlike arguments in the mainstream economics realm that described them quite positive, it seemed to have a lot of problems as well, which was also stated in the book as well.

And I think the book takes knowledge in the knowledge economy to be a contributor to the
economic growth and looks at both high-end and low-end work including care work. There are high-end types of work like financial services or dealing which are externalized or embrained on the one hand, and such types of work with tacit knowledge which are not externalized.

10 years ago, when we discussed both explicit knowledge and tacit knowledge, we thought that tacit knowledge was crucial for capital accumulation and profit making, and it was also crucial that tacit knowledge be externalized and made more explicit.

Having examined issues of financialization and gender, and experienced the financial crisis, however, to analyze the current situations, should we interpret those types of knowledge in high-end work of knowledge economy like financial services, knowledge that is held and shared by those old boys groups as explicit knowledge? People who gave rise to the financial crisis coped with the situation by further deregulation of the financial sector and by printing out many, many bills, currency. That’s something that Sylvia had talked about in her book Crisis and how the fiscal deficits, instead of financial deregulation, had been blamed as the cause of the financial crisis and the sovereign crisis after that.

However, is the work in financial sector among high-end types of work in the financial economy really made explicit? Its remuneration is high and the benefits are plentiful and the information has been accumulated, held and dominated there. But I think that is increasingly disconnected with the fact that their knowledge is explicit since the financial crisis. Rather, tacit knowledge within men’s groups, boys who are working in financial service sector, are utilized to cope with situations after the financial crisis. Therefore, when we think and analyze the knowledge economy, how is it linked to giving rise to value after the financial crisis, that’s an area where we would need to pay some due attention too, I feel.

Emiko Ochiai

Emiko Ochiai is my name, a sociologist. As far as knowledge-based economy is concerned, I have something that I can sort through very clearly. Because even though there still are traditional industries, it seems as if knowledge-based sectors have become predominantly important in our society in the discussion of knowledge economy. While there are people who work in knowledge-based sectors, there still are ordinary factory work, and care work which are not knowledge-based, but rather old type industries. So the structure has multi-levels, and their interrelationships are something I am not very clear about.

In the presidential election of the United States, it is said that dissatisfaction of many people in the traditional industries which have been deindustrialized has exploded. However, the discussions of knowledge-based economy or new economy tend to take our mind off those things, and they have in fact loopholes in that sense. Our economy has not been totally renewed, but it has a sort of multifaceted structure. Therefore, how the situation with diverse economies is treated, I would like to know. I am sure that they have relationships with each other, and like to know the relationship between that and gender.

I do fully agree that the analysis on a nation level, state level, is really effective, but I would also like to see the analysis that transcends nation-states as Matsukawa-san commented. We can’t see industries nowadays in our industrialized states, because they’ve moved to China for instance in the global system, there’s been that division of labor that has taken place.

Within knowledge-based sectors, there is an international division of labor taking place. To India, for example, call centers have moved and there are many Indian engineers working in the
United States. Those kinds of international division of labor were not very clear to us in the past, so how are we going to think about that is my question.

From Asia, Japan was analyzed in the book, but I am very anxious to know how its framework can be used for other Asian countries, since I do a lot of comparisons of Asian countries. We can’t simply say that economies of other Asian countries are not so much knowledge-based. Therefore, perhaps I am asking for something difficult to obtain, but if we look at Asian countries other than Japan, what sort of further developments we can make from the discussions in this book I would like to ask.

Another point I would like to talk about, if I may please. This is just a small thing, but with regard to making tacit knowledge into explicit knowledge, maybe it is required at the job level. But when it comes to interpersonal relationship and interpersonal communications, perhaps we should guarantee the opportunities for such communications to everyone. For example, reducing the working hours for male workers would give them more opportunity to communicate with the community members and engage in the child caring. Such direct communications in the process of acquiring tacit knowledge are not simply the learning process but in themselves give a lot of joy for everyone. It enriches your life. So instead of reducing such communications to just a learning opportunity to acquire knowledge, they should be seen as an opportunity to enrich their life. So, it’s probably more important than making tacit into explicit knowledge.

Mari Osawa
Thank you very much. We would now like to enter into the reply part. Dr. Ueno asked about new economy, and if optimism towards new economy has ended into pessimism, and in the wave of knowledge economy if the gap between women who have caught such wave and women who haven’t is widening, and maybe Japanese women are the biggest losers in those waves of knowledge economy, according to this book. So, as feminists, how should we understand that? And then Nishikawa-san, you received a specific question, please answer to that. And as for Dr. Adachi’s point, perhaps Sylvia is suitable person.

And also, Dr. Ochiai’s question, actually there are several questions. Towards the end, you talked about the gendering of the knowledge economy, how it can be applied to the comparative study in Asian countries was her question. So maybe Dr. Shin Kiyon, you wanted to say something and this is relevant to the point we just made. Can I talk now?

Shin Ki-young
This question is relevant to Dr. Adachi’s question and it came to my mind when she was talking. That the perspective of the globalization, global perspective is essential is basically my starting point, because though it is discussed that one of the characteristics of the knowledge economy was new spatiality, temporality, contractuality, but in the Global South or in the third world, there were lot of traditional home-based work that have such formation characteristics.

Therefore, three characteristics that are related to knowledge economy already seem to be valid in the Global South, but are they different? Perhaps the contents as well as objects of work are different, but the forms of work in industrialized countries and traditional home-based work in Global South, are rather similar. Women work at home with local
knowledge in Global South, and they have been involved into the global economy, and the forms of their work have the three characteristics mentioned above. So what the panelists discussed today are not limited to knowledge economy in industrialized economies, but rather global with different implications and different roles.

And also, when we think about rolling this out in Asian countries, the biggest difference I see is that in Asia the levels of economic development are much different amongst countries and division is actually ranked. The division of labor is quite elaborate and some workers have local knowledge and provide cheap labor, but industrialized countries is taking advantage of such local knowledge to make big profits. Asian countries are connected in such bottom to top kind of ranked relations, and these factors need to be taken into consideration.

So global perspective, transnational perspective need to be introduced to understand how some kind of knowledge is exploited trans-regionally and trans-nationally, and how some kind of knowledge is localized while other kind of knowledge can have global values.

Mari Osawa
Dr. Ochiai said that there are industries not based on knowledge, and when we say knowledge economy, it seems that we call entire economy as knowledge-based, and makes it difficult to see the no-knowledge-based industries. So perhaps we can take some replies about that point, maybe Karen Shire – Karen can also respond to that.

Karen Shire
Thanks for the questions and I would like to address this issue of the heterogeneity within and between capitalist economies. You are perfectly right that we have not only technology-based or science-based sectors of the economy but that the industrial economy also continues, and is stronger in developing market economies. In terms of shares of employment, we can say that these old parts of the economy are declining in the most advanced economies, but what is not decreasing are the social problems inherent to the decrease of these old industries. We have high employment rates among former workers of these old industries and where there are still old industries, we have precarious work. At the same time, we see a rise of precarious work in the service sector which is taking a larger share of employment in comparison to the old industries, what we call a pink-collar proletariat or pink-collar workers. There are low wages and there are long working hours or working hours which impede reconciliation of work and family. For example, in retail, an analysis of this type of work in Germany called this precarious work, that is temporary contracts, low-wage work, no access to further education, high turnover within the workforce and exploitation [ph 03:01:56] of disadvantages certain types of workers may have, be it ethnicity, be it gender, be it that they are young and have difficulties of entering the labor market.

You are perfectly right that if we analyze changes within the economy by referring to new activities, new technologies and higher educated workers in demand for a lot of these jobs, we also have to look at the decline and precariousness of industrial employment as part of this change. So, I would agree that in this respect we have to really enlarge our analysis and this of course also refers to the international division of labor because there are some countries in the Global North who can
produce all this advancement with regard to the technology implied in work and the knowledge which you need to perform these new types of work, but it’s only on the basis of parts of work which are outsourced to other countries. And there’s also I would argue a new degree in exploitation of types of informal work, which we might not see in the Global North but which we can see in the Global South, but also transnational labor migration from the South to the North is part of this shifting international division of labour. I don’t know, I don’t want to consume too much time, but if I may, I would briefly reply to the two questions Professor Matsukawa raised.

The first was the question of how to analyze the intersections of class, ethnicity and gender, and second, how can producers of tacit knowledge be understood or what does it mean for research. My answer to the first question about inequalities is two-fold: it’s both a methodological question and a question of theory. What we tried to do in this volume, as Sylvia referred to in her comment, is to make clear that there are different systems of inequality at work in advanced capitalism, and one refers to gender and gender regimes and another one refers to class and what we now see is that there are also regimes of inequality regarding ethnicity or also with regard to being migrants. And in research I think theoretically we have to be aware of different types of inequality. I think it is crucial that we do not take one type of inequality as the dominant one but that in empirical research we remain open to research about the different sources and different effects of complex inequalities.

So, this would be my answer to the first question about inequalities. In relation tacit knowledge and the producers or those who hold or embody this knowledge: We can make assumptions that there is tacit knowledge but we cannot know what kind of knowledge this is and that is an empirical question.

Mari Osawa
Okay. Heidi, would you respond to Chizuko Ueno’s two questions?

Heidi Gottfried
Hello. Okay. I would like to combine several of the questions with regard to optimism and also the different sort of connections between different spatialities or different contractualities across divisions, whether we are talking about global cities, we can talk about also relationship between different sectors of different countries and the economy. I am old enough to remember the optimism that we had in terms of the knowledge economy, that the knowledge economy would free labor from exploitation, that was a possibility. So, this was a sense that we would become producers of a new economy that could be possibly less exploitative, and that in terms of gender equality that there would be opportunities because of increasing education, that women would enter these occupations in equal numbers as men.

But in fact, one of the things that we show in our comparison is there’s both optimism and also pessimism, and that’s why we need to continue to look at the intersectional relationship between race, class, gender and also citizenship. I think that’s what you’re talking about. We cannot just talk about systems that are closed within the national container, but we can analyze a regulation at a national level because that indeed is where regulation occurs. So, how citizenship and holding a passport affects one’s life and vulnerabilities really varies across different countries, within our four countries as well as the Global North and South. So, I think that we need to take into account, so intersectionality has
to have these different components.

In our book, because we decided to look at the national, we didn’t mean to imply that they are in fact containers. I know there’s methodological nationalism that does assume this. This is not the assumption of the book or in the book. We do in fact talk about globalization, but we don’t talk about the re-division of labor, in particular knowledge labor, that’s occurring within the global economy. Take for example Tokyo. I’ve done a paper on the origin of Tokyo as a global city. So you see the ways in which Tokyo is a site for a high knowledge and then also care workers to service these elite knowledge workers, but we can’t just look at the global cities independently; they are nodal points within the circulation of capital. So, there is both optimism and pessimism.

The pessimism also has to do with the kinds of promises and guarantees that were implicit to the old social bargain. We sort of deconstruct that, that in fact these guarantees and promises were very limited to man, and let me bring it to the US election because the US election in part is reflected in the global economy and the knowledge economy more specifically. So, the communities that voted for Trump were precisely those communities that have been de-industrialized, that have been dispossessed, and so they are the ones that are left behind. This is also Brexit. They are the ones that are left behind in this global economy, in the industrial or the Global North. Industrial workers feel out of place. There is still industrial work, but increasingly that’s in the Global South.

The kinds of possibilities for the future cannot be known. So, the vote for Trump by – I am from Detroit and so this is the heart and origin of Fordism as a system, so I know it well, and the state voted for, by a small margin, Trump in part because what is the future of this industrial working class. So, I think that we can connect these different aspects of the old economy that is connected and articulated with this new economy. There are winners and losers and the winners and losers are not just men and women, we talked about this heterogeneity, but it’s also class based. There’re a lot of men who have lost in this new economy in places like Japan and in places like the US and the UK to explain a phenomenon that was unexpected, and some women are gaining because of education, so there is heterogeneity. I think it’s much more complex, and why we need to have an intersectional analysis and one that is also global.

Mari Osawa
Thank you very much. Then Makiko, please. Dr. Nishikawa to Ms. Adachi’s question, the financial sector and the high-end knowledge workers, it is not explicit knowledge perhaps but more tacit knowledge that they have. If you have any thoughts on that, could you please touch upon that as well?

Makiko Nishikawa
Yes, but I have too much thoughts in my mind at the moment to address the financial sector. So let me start with the first question that the evaluation of care work is still set low. I do agree to this point. Earlier I talked that economic value and social value are not necessarily of equal value, and suggested that economic value of care is lowered than its social value. So what needs to be done? This is a very important question. This question is also relevant to the additional comments given by the two commentators. I would like to talk about what need to be done, but my talk will be limited on my thought at the moment.
One important thing is, in the end, what is the quality of care? I think “quality” will be one of the key words. This is especially relevant to Prof. Hagiwara’s comment. I hope I didn’t misunderstand this time. What I understood from your comment is that what is evaluated can be distorted if the decision is left to the market.

However, in the care service sector, we must admit that the competitive advantage in the market comes from the quality of care services offered by care corporations. I suppose everybody wants to buy the care services from the corporation which offers high quality care. It’s a different story whether or not you have options to select a competitive care provider in your residential area, but let us now focus on the quality of care. If the quality of care is the source of the corporate or organizational competitiveness, then it becomes all the more important how we evaluate the quality of care. But I think this evaluation is very difficult indeed.

Anyhow, let’s assume that we can reach an agreement on the quality of care, while leaving aside the problem of how to reach this agreement as this is very difficult, then we can evaluate care services based on the agreement. As I said before, if you are living in the area where you have many options of service providers, perhaps care quality is already evaluated in this way. Thus, based on the evaluation of care quality, you choose your service provider. Also, when it comes to human resources in the care sector, care workers should be remunerated on the basis of the quality of care they offer to their clients.

However, as I mentioned before, there still remains a question as to what is high quality care. I don’t think there is a shared understanding when it comes to this point. This is the real problem. In order to obtain the shared understanding about what is high quality care, we need to develop some kind of systematization. I think Prof. Ochiai suggested that we should allow many parties to participate in care activities. I do agree.

But given the current situation that care providers are divided and care work is individualized, the opportunities of actually sharing care experiences have been decreasing. In order to appreciate the social value of care, we should increase this kind of opportunities more and more. Encouraging the participation of men is one thing. Thus, first of all, we need to reach an agreement on what is high quality care, and then make the evaluation of care quality based on that agreement. This evaluation should be applied to both care services and care workers who provide the services. In this way, I think the gap between the economic value and social value of care will be narrowed. Also, when it comes to the possibility of reaching an agreement on the quality of care, I believe this very much depends on how matured our society is.

Seiichi Matsukawa
I am sorry that I am jumping in. A few years back, I had opportunity to listen to the research conducted by a British researcher and it was about the city in London and it was about the hedge fund dealers, basically knowledge workers, and what they do was the topic of research amongst the hedge funds. He, the researcher, focused on the short and long transactions. So you would predict the price fluctuation to do the hedging and it’s about 10 years ago, nearly 10 years ago, the post-share, the stock price invited – led to a major chaos because hedge fund leaders did the short selling off the post-share stocks which caused huge losses, damages. Why it happened was that the dealers has knowledge workers collect, gather various pieces of information to make forecast or prediction so they would
create several potential scenarios, but they don’t develop such scenarios on their own.

When they create scenarios, they would look for people who would endorse their scenarios and that led to the creation of the informal network amongst the peer workers, dealers. Informal and tacit knowledge is based on the trustful relationship. It’s a very closed world that is really controlling the hedge fund business. Who can have access to such closed network was the topic of the research and there was no gender elements in that research so that aspect was not explained, but it is not hard to imagine that it is very likely only male workers who can be accepted by closed network, and if female workers are to be accepted, I mean those female workers need to fit into the certain type. So, the cutting-edge knowledge economy such informal and intimate community plays an important role and that’s been gendered. I think that is understandable.

Mari Osawa
Thank you very much for your intervention. Old boys’ network or it is said that those in the dealing rooms of the financial sector tend to retire at the age of 35, so they cannot be called old boys. But according to a research done at the Harvard University, testosterone, the male hormone, is deeply relevant to the risk taking and dealing with the high-risk appetite. So, the financial sector, the corporate of the financial sector is strongly gendered is the points that have been made. Now could I ask Sylvia to wrap up the session.

Sylvia Walby
Thank you very much for your excellent comments and questions. So in 6 minutes, I am going to give you the problem and the solution. Okay! The problem: globalization. We took it for granted, when we wrote the book, that globalization was the problem. In fact, the name of our group was GLOW, Globalization, Gender and Work Transformation. This was the background assumption for the work that we undertook. Today, we would differentiate globalization into different kinds of processes, in particular we would differentiate the flows of finance capital from industrial capital since these are distinct kinds of capital with different implications – indeed it has been finance capital that has been destabilizing the real economy. So, while we would add that distinction today; nevertheless, our assumption that the imbalance between capital and labour in processes of globalization is a continuing feature of our identification of the problem.

The solution was democratic regulation. Although we did not use the term ‘democratization’, this was the implied meaning of the term ‘regulation’. After all, regulations came from states; states were democratic (we assumed); and regulations would control the conditions of employments, the equal pay, working time and so forth. We had social policy, pensions and welfare. We assumed this was a consequence of democracy. Since states varied, the second part of our book was about comparative regulation. We assumed that these regulations took different forms in different places, which they were spatially specific, which meant specific to particular forms of social formation and particular to the balance of political forces.

Did we name ‘feminism’ very clearly? We probably said ‘gender equality projects’. You have translators. You know that means ‘feminism’. So, we took for granted certain things for which today we would probably give a different word. Today, we would compare the strength of feminism, compare
the gendered democratization of our states, compare the balance between the different forms of capital, and compare different kinds of regulation. We would use the word ‘intersectionality’ today. We used to say gender and class. Today, we say intersectionality. Today, we are aware that there is a complex articulation of class, gender, and ethnicity in concepts and practices of migration. For example, in the analysis of how the blame for the crisis in Europe and the US, which could have been attributed to finance and the bankers, has in practice been attributed to the migrants, this analysis includes the intersection of class, gender and ethnicity.

The analysis of the complex civil societal negotiations of the intersection of these issues today, re-articulates very similar questions to those that in our analysis of the gendering of the knowledge economy. These issues concern the restructuring of the economy, which include some positive features such as the increase in higher education and skill with potential implications for gender equality. Re-gendered states have sometimes made important contributions through the socialized provision of services, to the creation of human capital and reduced gender inequality. Such positive interventions by states need to be clearly separated from the problematic developments of the de-democratization of the labor market, and the de-regulation of employment which enabled the growth of precarity, the instability of jobs, and the lack of employment protections. Thus, we separate the ‘knowledge economy’, and its human capital enhancing aspects, from the ‘new economy, and its deregulatory aspects.

It was all there in the book! I am now merely giving you the 2016—re-conceptualization of what we wrote in the book - in empirical detail as well as theoretical analysis. While I am giving our analysis a nudge in the direction of the contemporary theorization, we were always analyzing the problematic features of globalization for the restructuring of the economy, the feminist resistance to that restructuring, and the complex intersections of forces that play out in different ways because of the different balance of forces in those different locations. We now understand the complexity of the spatialities and temporalities and contractualities in new kinds of ways. We need to come together to share this in order to better theorize the world, the better to change it. Thank you.

Mari Osawa

Thank you very much. It was such a wonderful finish as always. We thank you very much for your conclusions. Thank you very much to the staff members. They are standing by and we want to be able to smoothly show you out of this hall. However, we also have the authors and the editors who are still with us. They will be standing outside the hall and there will be an opportunity perhaps to converse with the participants but not a very long time, although we would like you not to hesitate and to please feel free to speak with the participants. Thank you very much to all those who have supported us. Thank you to the interpreters for supporting us for a long time.

Though it’s warm inside, not a few people worked outside at the reception desk and helped us in many ways, if you could please offer your words of thanks to them on the way out. Thank you once again to all the presenters.