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2020年度

日時 3月9日(火)10時半~12時10分

場所 N/A
タイトル Persuade, Position, or Pander? --Competence Claiming and the Political Economy of Democratic Governance in Developed Open-Economies--
報告者 樋渡 展洋(社会科学研究所)
※関係者限りの開催となります。
報告要旨

 If the goal of mainstream party leaders is power (in competitive democracies as elsewhere), how do their campaigns to win elections and legislative strategies to draw public support shape the way they accomplish democratic representation and accountability; and what are the consequences of such practices for governing a developed open economy? This study contends that competence claiming is the key to understand how leaders represent the voter concerns of, and are held accountable for solving, impending economic problems of economic growth and personal wellbeing. Competence claiming uniquely maintains that parties change their positions when representing the shifting voters’ concerns of cyclical and evolutional changes of the economy and that they strive to produce legislative results to account for voters’ demand for economic growth and personal wellbeing (under the constraints of fiscal responsibility imposed by capital mobility).

 Although leader survival is a basic assumption in the studies of developing countries and economic assessment by the voter is the main focus of economic voting theories, no study has combined the two views to examine how democratic competition among leaders in and out of power are shaped by voters’anxieties about the economy during campaigns and voters' assessment of government performance in-between elections. The strength of competence claiming theorizing is apparent when compared to the canonic paradigm of ideological-position taking, which argues that parties compete to represent stable ideological preferences of their supporters at elections (“spatial voting theory”), instead of responding to shifting voter concerns of the changing economy, and that parties strive to legislate their partisan priorities in government (“party government theory”), resulting in the prevalence of neoliberal policies, as economies globalize, that discount the problems of jobs and income (i.e., personal wellbeing), which had traditionally been owned by the left.

 Competence claiming consists of four empirically testable assertions, which are evaluated by using data from 20 OECD countries from 1975 to 2012. Above all, mainstream political parties change their policy positions in response to economic cycles rather than maintaining fixed positions favoring either free markets or economic security. During booms, mainstream parties (regardless of ideology) address personal economic security issues, while they like-mindedly prioritize market-led economic revival during recessions by assuring financial markets and the central bank. Issues allegedly owned by the right and left parties are tackled sequentially, irrespective of partisanship. Second, government leaders seek legislative productivity instead of party government, being more accommodative to vocal opposition (to avoid gridlock) that increases policy stability despite government changes. Third, mainstream parties struggle to provide solutions among three conflicting demands: fiscal responsibility for market stability, market augmentation to spur growth, and personal economic security for political stability. As such, governments often pursue policies that are inexplicable by ideological positioning or neoliberal dominance: Cyclical fiscal adjustments are confined to government consumption; fiscal reforms often protect social expenditures (for personal wellbeing), aggravating the tension between the neoliberal goals of tax cuts and public debt reduction; and market reforms include measures to create new markets (not just promote competition) to generate employment, making governments reluctant to unilaterally cut unemployment expenditure or deregulate labor markets. And, finally, the main threat to competence claiming persuasion is anti-establishment populism that pander voters with dubious policy solutions, rather than ideological polarization characteristic of extreme position taking.

問合せ先 社会科学研究所 研究戦略室(iss-strategy@iss.u-tokyo.ac.jp
日時 3月16日(火)15時~16時40分

場所 N/A
タイトル 贈与の使い方・使われ方 ー日仏における近時の議論を素材としてー
報告者 齋藤 哲志(社会科学研究所)
※所内限りの開催となります。
報告要旨

 フランスで近時公表された二つの報告書ーー「遺留分 La réserve héréditaire」〔2019〕、「フランス式フィランソロピー La philanthropie à la française」〔2020〕ーー、および、わが国の2018年相続法改正を素材として、いわゆる贈与(場合により広く無償行為を含む意味で用いる)と法との「相性の悪さ」について考えてみたい。

問合せ先 社会科学研究所 研究戦略室(iss-strategy@iss.u-tokyo.ac.jp

2021年度

日時 4月13日(火)15時~16時40分
場所 N/A ※所員限定の開催となります。
タイトル TBA
報告者 TBA
報告要旨

TBA

問合せ先 社会科学研究所 研究戦略室(iss-strategy@iss.u-tokyo.ac.jp
日時 5月11日(火)15時~16時40分
場所 N/A ※所員限定の開催となります。
タイトル TBA
報告者 TBA
報告要旨

TBA

問合せ先 社会科学研究所 研究戦略室(iss-strategy@iss.u-tokyo.ac.jp


主要開催場所

設備名 社研内配置
第一会議室 社会科学研究所1F
ミーティングルームB 社会科学研究所1F
センター会議室 赤門総合研究棟5F
センター作業室 赤門総合研究棟5F